Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour
Threat actormediumExploited in the wild

xHunt Campaign: New Watering Hole Identified for Credential Harvesting

Palo Alto Unit 42by Brittany Barbehenn ()7 min read2
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 tied the xHunt campaign to a watering hole on a Kuwait government website used to passively harvest visitors' NTLM credential hashes.

Palo Alto Unit 42 identified a Kuwait government organization's webpage injected with hidden HTML referencing image paths on domains (microsofte-update.com, learn-service.com) tied to xHunt/Hisoka C2 infrastructure. When visitors loaded the page, Windows would attempt SMB/NetBIOS authentication to the remote share, allowing the operators to capture NTLM hashes that could be cracked or relayed. Related DNS redirect activity on xHunt infrastructure in 2019 pointed to additional credential-harvesting interest against Kuwaiti government email servers.

Key facts
  • Hidden image on Kuwait government site triggered NTLM challenge-response authentication
  • Responder tool in lab confirmed domain, username, IP, and NTLM hash capture
  • Domains linked to xHunt/Hisoka command-and-control infrastructure
  • DNS redirects on operator infrastructure suggested email credential harvesting
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domain6google.comupdate[.]top) 192.99.138[.]6 4/14/2019 - 5/4/2019 Sakabota (6google[.]com) 104.168.136[.]161 6/24/2019 Newly identified DNS redirec
domainalforatsystem.comactivity 213.202.217[.]0,22 6/1/2018, 12/24/2018 Sakabota (alforatsystem[.]com) 213.202.217[.]4 9/8/2018 Sakabota (firewallsupports[.]co
domainantivirus-update.toped DNS redirect activity 192.99.138[.]4 4/24/2019 Sakabota (antivirus-update[.]top) 192.99.138[.]6 4/14/2019 - 5/4/2019 Sakabota (6google[.]
domaincloudipnameserver.comd DNS Hijacking Activity 185.15.247[.]140 1/14/2017 Oilrig (cloudipnameserver[.]com) 185.15.247[.]140 9/9/2018 Sakabota (sakabota[.]com) 185.
domainffconnectivitycheck.com/2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.174.101[.]66 8/6/2018 Oilrig (ffconnectivitycheck[.]com) 185.174.101[.]68 2/14/2019 DNSpionage Campaign 199.247.3
domainfirewallsupports.comta (alforatsystem[.]com) 213.202.217[.]4 9/8/2018 Sakabota (firewallsupports[.]com) 213.202.217[.]9 11/18/2018 - 11/29/2018 Oilrig (googie[.
domaingoogie.emailorts[.]com) 213.202.217[.]9 11/18/2018 - 11/29/2018 Oilrig (googie[.]email) 91.132.139[.]200 4/16/2019, 5/12/2019 Newly identified D
domaingoogle-update.comdate[.]com) 104.168.244[.]213 7/15/2019 - 7/18/2019 Hisoka (google-update[.]com) Additional Resources xHunt Campaign: xHunt Actor’s Cheat
domainlearn-service.comeferenced the domain microsofte-update[.]com but changed to learn-service[.]com in December 2019. As of January 2020, this image is no lo
domainlowconnectivity.com2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.161.211[.]86 10/4/2018 Oilrig (lowconnectivity[.]com) 185.161.209[.]147 11/28/2018 Widespread DNS Hijacking Ac
domainmicrosofte-update.comure. Beginning in May 2019, the image referenced the domain microsofte-update[.]com but changed to learn-service[.]com in December 2019. As o
domainsakabota.comresolution of interest is with the Sakabota related domain sakabota[.]com . This domain resolved to the IP address 185.15.247[.]140
domainzombsroyale.ioActivity 199.247.3[.]186 - 198 5/6/2018 - 8/30/2018 Chafer (zombsroyale[.]io) 213.202.217[.]31 7/6/2018 Newly identified DNS redirect
ipv4104.168.136.16192.99.138[.]6 4/14/2019 - 5/4/2019 Sakabota (6google[.]com) 104.168.136[.]161 6/24/2019 Newly identified DNS redirect activity 104.168.
ipv4104.168.244.213.136[.]161 6/24/2019 Newly identified DNS redirect activity 104.168.244[.]213 7/14/2019 Hisoka (microsofte-update[.]com) 104.168.244[.]
ipv4185.15.247.140ain sakabota[.]com . This domain resolved to the IP address 185.15.247[.]140 in September 2018. Between December 2017 and January 2018
ipv4185.161.209.147n 185.161.211[.]86 10/4/2018 Oilrig (lowconnectivity[.]com) 185.161.209[.]147 11/28/2018 Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity 185.174.101[
ipv4185.161.211.72[.]com) 185.15.247[.]140 9/9/2018 Sakabota (sakabota[.]com) 185.161.211[.]72 - 79 9/28/2018 - 10/26/2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.161.2
ipv4185.161.211.8661.211[.]72 - 79 9/28/2018 - 10/26/2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.161.211[.]86 10/4/2018 Oilrig (lowconnectivity[.]com) 185.161.209[.]14
ipv4185.174.101.66185.174.101[.]68 9/28/2018 - 10/11/2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.174.101[.]66 8/6/2018 Oilrig (ffconnectivitycheck[.]com) 185.174.101[.
ipv4185.174.101.68.161.209[.]147 11/28/2018 Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity 185.174.101[.]68 9/28/2018 - 10/11/2018 DNSpionage Campaign 185.174.101[.]
ipv4192.99.138.491.132.139[.]183 4/7/2019 Hisoka (microsofte-update[.]com) 192.99.138[.]4 4/17/2019 - 6/17/2019 Newly identified DNS redirect activ
ipv4192.99.138.6192.99.138[.]4 4/24/2019 Sakabota (antivirus-update[.]top) 192.99.138[.]6 4/14/2019 - 5/4/2019 Sakabota (6google[.]com) 104.168.136
ipv4199.247.3.186199.247.3[.]191 11/5/2018 Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity 199.247.3[.]186 - 198 5/6/2018 - 8/30/2018 Chafer (zombsroyale[.]io) 213.
ipv4199.247.3.191check[.]com) 185.174.101[.]68 2/14/2019 DNSpionage Campaign 199.247.3[.]191 11/5/2018 Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity 199.247.3[.]1
ipv4213.202.217.31[.]186 - 198 5/6/2018 - 8/30/2018 Chafer (zombsroyale[.]io) 213.202.217[.]31 7/6/2018 Newly identified DNS redirect activity 213.202.2
ipv4213.202.217.4[.]0,22 6/1/2018, 12/24/2018 Sakabota (alforatsystem[.]com) 213.202.217[.]4 9/8/2018 Sakabota (firewallsupports[.]com) 213.202.217[.]
ipv4213.202.217.9213.202.217[.]4 9/8/2018 Sakabota (firewallsupports[.]com) 213.202.217[.]9 11/18/2018 - 11/29/2018 Oilrig (googie[.]email) 91.132.13
ipv491.132.139.1834/16/2019, 5/12/2019 Newly identified DNS redirect activity 91.132.139[.]183 4/7/2019 Hisoka (microsofte-update[.]com) 192.99.138[.]4
ipv491.132.139.200202.217[.]9 11/18/2018 - 11/29/2018 Oilrig (googie[.]email) 91.132.139[.]200 4/16/2019, 5/12/2019 Newly identified DNS redirect activi

From the original article

7 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

During the analysis of the xHunt campaign activities, we identified a Kuwait government organization’s webpage used as an apparent watering hole. The webpage contained a hidden image which was observed between June and December 2019, and referenced domains associated with malicious activity conducted by the xHunt campaign operators.

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Brittany Barbehenn · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.