Paper compares mining power-adjusting attacks under real pool payouts
Original title: Power Adjusting Games Under Block-Dependent Pool Payout Schemes
PPLNS is least vulnerable to the analyzed attacks; PROP is highly exposed to hopping without block withholding.
The paper analyzes T-PAW, which includes FAW and PAW, under payout schemes used in practice: Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS), round-based Proportional (PROP) and exponential-decay (EXP), rather than the rarely used global-reset proportional scheme. It also introduces Power Adjusting Hopping (PAH), where an adversary of any size shifts power by blockwork age without withholding a block, and derives revenue ratios under PROP and EXP. GRP overstates T-PAW gain under PROP by up to an order of magnitude and understates it under EXP for the original slush decay rate. PPLNS is immune to PAH and only mitigates T-PAW. Results are checked with Monte Carlo simulations.
Unconfirmed: Revenue ratios are analytical and simulation results, not measurements from live pools.
- T-PAW includes FAW and PAW as special cases.
- PAH adjusts power by round age and withholds no block.
- A slow EXP decay invites PAH; a fast decay invites T-PAW.
- PPLNS mitigates T-PAW but does not eliminate it.
- Analytical revenue ratios were checked by Monte Carlo simulation.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgAdvanced power adjusting block withholding attacks such as PAW and T-PAW have been analyzed so far under a global-reset version of the proportional scheme (GRP), which is rarely used in practice.
By Mustafa Doger · arxiv.org
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