Matrix refreshing provides leakage-resilient computation under continual local leakage
Original title: Leakage-Resilient Computation via Matrix Refreshing
A simple refresh mechanism using uniform invertible matrices secures shares against local leakage achieving statistical distance at most C·T·2^{6λ-n/9} after T refreshes with λ bits leakage per party.
We prove that a simple refresh in which the left party multiplies its share by a uniform invertible matrix M and the right party multiplies its share by M^{-1} is secure under continual local leakage. After T refreshes each allowing at most λ bits of leakage per party the transcripts for two stored secrets are at statistical distance at most C·T·2^{6λ-n/9} for an absolute constant C. We also obtain a Boolean-circuit compiler with statistical privacy error at most C·S·2^{18λ-n/27} for S operations.
- Simple matrix-based refresh is secure under continual local leakage
- Boolean-circuit compiler provides statistical privacy error bound
- Guarantee covers repeated stateful evaluations with adaptively chosen public inputs
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgLeakage-resilient cryptography protects secrets against side-channel attacks, in which a physical implementation reveals partial information about its internal state. A fundamental primitive in this area is a leakage-resilient storage, which allows a secret to be stored in a way that remains secure even if an adversary learns some information about the storage's internal state.
By Stefan Dziembowski · arxiv.org
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.