Mustang Panda-linked hackers deploy LOTUSLITE V2 via Zoho WorkDrive
Original title: Mustang Panda-Linked Hackers Deploy LOTUSLITE V2 Through Malicious Zoho WorkDrive Downloads
Victims in Thailand run a PDFgear binary that sideloads a .NET backdoor, with registry and file-association persistence.
Antares Research says hackers linked to Mustang Panda, also known as Earth Preta, are distributing LOTUSLITE V2 through public Zoho WorkDrive downloads aimed at Thailand. An assessment-themed ZIP pairs a trusted PDFgear executable with a malicious DLL that is sideloaded after staging under ProgramData. The .NET implant uses registry Run or Load entries, changes PDFgear’s file association, and talks to two hardcoded servers over UDP or secure WebSocket with AES-256-GCM. The report describes abuse of a public download link, not a Zoho vulnerability, and does not say how targets first received the link.
Unconfirmed: How each target first received the WorkDrive link is not established, and attribution remains subject to revision.
- Antares assessed the LOTUSLITE lineage with high confidence on November 15.
- Persistence uses a system Run key as SYSTEM, otherwise the user Load value.
- C2 addresses are XOR-decoded at runtime; the protocol marker is 0x50524F31.
- Older LOTUSLITE protocol signatures will miss the updated identifier.
Impact: Backdoor access to targeted Windows systems
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| Zoho WorkDrive | — |
| PDFgear | — |
- 1.Correlate unexpected PDFgear execution, registry changes, unusual library loads, and outbound connections.
- 2.Treat older LOTUSLITE protocol signatures as insufficient for the updated marker.
- ATT&CK
- T1204.002 Malicious FileT1574.002 DLL Side-LoadingT1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderT1573 Encrypted Channel
- Vendors
- Zoho
- Threat actors
- Mustang PandaEarth Preta
- Malware
- LOTUSLITE V2
- Organizations
- Antares Research
- Countries
- Thailand
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | files-accl.zohoexternal.com | of compromise (IoCs):- Type Indicator Context Download host files-accl[.]zohoexternal[.]com Public archive delivery C2 address 31[.]59[.]184[.]185 |
| ipv4 | 103.175.50.32 | ss 31[.]59[.]184[.]185 Observed network activity C2 address 103[.]175[.]50[.]32 Multiport communications Executable C:\ProgramData\Mi |
| ipv4 | 31.59.184.185 | ccl[.]zohoexternal[.]com Public archive delivery C2 address 31[.]59[.]184[.]185 Observed network activity C2 address 103[.]175[.]50[. |
| sha256 | 33cf56f15b9e069e3f21d23338ec96c2aaf6edd4f2baadcea2af39e1968515ea | 37e060398ce6fe52eb811ebc67a439ef37297e5014f Archive SHA-256 33cf56f15b9e069e3f21d23338ec96c2aaf6edd4f2baadcea2af39e1968515ea Assessment executable and staged executable SHA-256 4748571 |
| sha256 | 4748571d98c6af34f4967a3886f73b4421239a1203f048140d3bfdaf8aa78937 | 68515ea Assessment executable and staged executable SHA-256 4748571d98c6af34f4967a3886f73b4421239a1203f048140d3bfdaf8aa78937 Malicious DLL Note: IP addresses and domains are intentiona |
| sha256 | d74fee10090cae17655d137e060398ce6fe52eb811ebc67a439ef37297e5014f | , 21 , 8080 , 1080 Configured communication options SHA-256 d74fee10090cae17655d137e060398ce6fe52eb811ebc67a439ef37297e5014f Archive SHA-256 33cf56f15b9e069e3f21d23338ec96c2aaf6edd4f2b |
From the original article
4 min read at cybersecuritynews.com
Hackers linked to Mustang Panda are distributing LOTUSLITE V2 through public Zoho WorkDrive downloads, using an Indo-Pacific assessment lure to draw victims into running malware. The campaign, focused on Thailand, combines a trusted PDFgear executable, malicious DLL loading, registry persistence, and encrypted command-and-control communications to establish access to Windows systems.
By Tushar Subhra Dutta · cybersecuritynews.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.