Sequent CEO questions security of US voting machines
Original title: How Secure Are US Elections? Voting Machine Risks and the Growing Threat of AI
Shai Bargil argues EAC certification can leave ballot machines unpatched for years and that barcodes hide what is counted.
A SecurityWeek explainer reviews in-person US voting with EAC-certified, air-gapped ballot-marking devices that print paper ballots, often with a barcode or QR code, which scanners then count. Sequent co-founder Shai Bargil says certification is poorly tied to the four-year cycle and can leave software unpatched for two years or more. He says machines taken to DEF CON’s Voting Village have been hacked with hands-on access, and that voters cannot visually check barcode data used in counting. The piece treats a USB-based repeat of such a hack as possible but implausible.
Unconfirmed: The compromised-machine scenario is presented as hypothetical, not as a confirmed election incident.
- Most of the discussion covers Election Day machines, not mail-in voting.
- Bargil says certification can take under two years and start in any year of the cycle.
- Paper ballots remain for later visual and statistical checks.
- Hard proof of foreign influence campaigns is described as difficult.
- Vendors
- Sequent
- Organizations
- Election Assistance Commission
- Countries
- United States
From the original article
10 min read at securityweek.com
Unpatched voting machines, unverifiable QR-coded ballots, and AI-driven influence campaigns leave US elections short of secure. The post How Secure Are US Elections? Voting Machine Risks and the Growing Threat of AI appeared first on SecurityWeek.
By Kevin Townsend · securityweek.com
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