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Threat Actors Target Government of Belarus Using CMSTAR Trojan

Palo Alto Unit 42by Josh Grunzweig ()13 min read2
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Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2015-1641
Memory Corruption RCE in Microsoft Office via Malicious RTF Files
—97%KEV—
KEV

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainmia.bys Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ablameiko@mia[.]by Unknown. Likely used by the Ministry of Internal Affairs
domainoeiowidfla22.comommunication, connecting to the following host on port 443: oeiowidfla22[.]com After the initial connection is established, BYEBY will c
ipv4108.61.175.110Ij5NaH.dat http://45.77.60[.]138/jVJlw3wp379neaJ.dat http://108.61.175[.]110/tlhXVFeBvT64LC9.dat http://45.77.60[.]138/HJDBvnJ7wc4S5qZ
ipv445.76.80.32sYCw5j.dat http://45.77.60[.]138/UScHrzGWbXb01gv.dat http://45.76.80[.]32/tYD7jzfVNZqMfye.dat http://45.77.60[.]138/liW0ecpxEWCfIgU
ipv445.77.60.13866c2a CMSTAR Download Locations in Phishing Campaign http://45.77.60[.]138/YXza9HkKWzqtXlt.dat http://45.77.60[.]138/mePVDjnAZsYCw5j
sha25609890dc8898b99647cdc1cceb97e764b6a88d55b5a520c8d0ea3bfd8f75ed83bb381bc3722304ab1a21a21e082583bf6b88b84e7f65c4fdda48971c20a2 09890dc8898b99647cdc1cceb97e764b6a88d55b5a520c8d0ea3bfd8f75ed83b fd22973451b88a4d10d9f485baef7f5e7a6f2cb9ce0826953571bd8f5d8
sha25616697c95db5add6c1c23b2591b9d8eec5ed96074d057b9411f0b57a54af298d5fc16ae785834908f024fb3ddd4d9d62b29675859a8e737e3b949e85327a 16697c95db5add6c1c23b2591b9d8eec5ed96074d057b9411f0b57a54af298d5 6843d183b41b6b22976fc8d85e448dcc4d2e0bd2c159e6d966bfd4afa1c
sha2562008ec82cec0b62bdb4d2cea64ff5a159a4327a058dfd867f877536389a72fb6e5921b0dfff9045ada7e775c1755e6ea44eab55da7ccc362f2a70ce26a6 2008ec82cec0b62bdb4d2cea64ff5a159a4327a058dfd867f877536389a72fb6 cecd72851c265f885ff02c60cbc3e6cbf1a40b298274761f623dfa44782
sha2562a0169c72c84e6d3fa49af701fd46ee7aaf1d1d9e107798d93a6ca8df5d25957f9aa617e7060779bc217a42372e99d59dc88f8ea2f3b9f45aacf3ba7209 2a0169c72c84e6d3fa49af701fd46ee7aaf1d1d9e107798d93a6ca8df5d25957 4da6ce5921b0dfff9045ada7e775c1755e6ea44eab55da7ccc362f2a70c
sha2562c8267192b196bf8a92c8b72d52096e46e307fa4d4dafdc030d3e0f5b4145e9e8ecdeceba83396c98370f8f458ea7f7a935aabbcc3d41b80d4e85746357 2c8267192b196bf8a92c8b72d52096e46e307fa4d4dafdc030d3e0f5b4145e9e 2debf12b1cb1291cbd096b24897856948734fa62fd61a1f24d379b4224b
sha2562debf12b1cb1291cbd096b24897856948734fa62fd61a1f24d379b4224bda2127192b196bf8a92c8b72d52096e46e307fa4d4dafdc030d3e0f5b4145e9e 2debf12b1cb1291cbd096b24897856948734fa62fd61a1f24d379b4224bda212 79b30634075896084135b9891c42fca8a59db1c0c731e445940671efab9
sha2563c3efa89d1dd39e1112558af38ba656e048be842a3bedb7933cdd4210025f791183b41b6b22976fc8d85e448dcc4d2e0bd2c159e6d966bfd4afa1cd9221 3c3efa89d1dd39e1112558af38ba656e048be842a3bedb7933cdd4210025f791 b2bebb381bc3722304ab1a21a21e082583bf6b88b84e7f65c4fdda48971
sha2564da6ce5921b0dfff9045ada7e775c1755e6ea44eab55da7ccc362f2a70ce26a69c72c84e6d3fa49af701fd46ee7aaf1d1d9e107798d93a6ca8df5d25957 4da6ce5921b0dfff9045ada7e775c1755e6ea44eab55da7ccc362f2a70ce26a6 2008ec82cec0b62bdb4d2cea64ff5a159a4327a058dfd867f877536389a
sha25665d5ef9aa617e7060779bc217a42372e99d59dc88f8ea2f3b9f45aacf3ba7209Compromise CMSTAR Variants Identified in Phishing Campaign 65d5ef9aa617e7060779bc217a42372e99d59dc88f8ea2f3b9f45aacf3ba7209 2a0169c72c84e6d3fa49af701fd46ee7aaf1d1d9e107798d93a6ca8df5d
sha2566843d183b41b6b22976fc8d85e448dcc4d2e0bd2c159e6d966bfd4afa1cd9221c95db5add6c1c23b2591b9d8eec5ed96074d057b9411f0b57a54af298d5 6843d183b41b6b22976fc8d85e448dcc4d2e0bd2c159e6d966bfd4afa1cd9221 3c3efa89d1dd39e1112558af38ba656e048be842a3bedb7933cdd421002
sha25679b30634075896084135b9891c42fca8a59db1c0c731e445940671efab9a0b6112b1cb1291cbd096b24897856948734fa62fd61a1f24d379b4224bda212 79b30634075896084135b9891c42fca8a59db1c0c731e445940671efab9a0b61 b0065fc16ae785834908f024fb3ddd4d9d62b29675859a8e737e3b949e8
sha256b0065fc16ae785834908f024fb3ddd4d9d62b29675859a8e737e3b949e85327a634075896084135b9891c42fca8a59db1c0c731e445940671efab9a0b61 b0065fc16ae785834908f024fb3ddd4d9d62b29675859a8e737e3b949e85327a 16697c95db5add6c1c23b2591b9d8eec5ed96074d057b9411f0b57a54af
sha256b2bebb381bc3722304ab1a21a21e082583bf6b88b84e7f65c4fdda48971c20a2a89d1dd39e1112558af38ba656e048be842a3bedb7933cdd4210025f791 b2bebb381bc3722304ab1a21a21e082583bf6b88b84e7f65c4fdda48971c20a2 09890dc8898b99647cdc1cceb97e764b6a88d55b5a520c8d0ea3bfd8f75
sha256cecd72851c265f885ff02c60cbc3e6cbf1a40b298274761f623dfa44782a01f8c82cec0b62bdb4d2cea64ff5a159a4327a058dfd867f877536389a72fb6 cecd72851c265f885ff02c60cbc3e6cbf1a40b298274761f623dfa44782a01f8 d8c0f8ecdeceba83396c98370f8f458ea7f7a935aabbcc3d41b80d4e857
sha256d8c0f8ecdeceba83396c98370f8f458ea7f7a935aabbcc3d41b80d4e857463572851c265f885ff02c60cbc3e6cbf1a40b298274761f623dfa44782a01f8 d8c0f8ecdeceba83396c98370f8f458ea7f7a935aabbcc3d41b80d4e85746357 2c8267192b196bf8a92c8b72d52096e46e307fa4d4dafdc030d3e0f5b41
sha256fd22973451b88a4d10d9f485baef7f5e7a6f2cb9ce0826953571bd8f5d866c2adc8898b99647cdc1cceb97e764b6a88d55b5a520c8d0ea3bfd8f75ed83b fd22973451b88a4d10d9f485baef7f5e7a6f2cb9ce0826953571bd8f5d866c2a CMSTAR Download Locations in Phishing Campaign http://45.77

From the original article

13 min read at unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified a series of phishing emails containing updated versions of the previously discussed CMSTAR malware family targeting various government entities in the country of Belarus. We first reported on CMSTAR in spear phishing attacks in spring of 2015 and later in 2016 .

Palo Alto Unit 42

By Josh Grunzweig · unit42.paloaltonetworks.com

Read the full article at Palo Alto Unit 42

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.