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Edimax BR-6478AC v2.20 setWAN handler has authenticated command injection

Original title: [0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)

Full Disclosure ()2
Part of a story covered by 5 sourcesEdimax BR-6478AC v2.20 has two authenticated root command injectionsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

A WAN-settings POST passes an unsanitized username into system(), and the check looks at one character.

0day Rubbish Research Team disclosed an authenticated command injection in Edimax BR-6478AC firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin. The dual-band AC1750 SOHO router is made by Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. of Taiwan. An authenticated POST to the setWAN WAN-configuration handler reaches system() with a request-controlled username placed unquoted in a shell command. The snippet names no patch.

Unconfirmed: The snippet is truncated and does not confirm a CVE, patch, or exploitation in the wild.

Key facts
  • The disclosure title rates the issue 7.2 and says execution is as root.
  • The sanitiser inspects exactly one character, the disclosure says.
  • The vulnerable request resembles an ordinary WAN settings submission.
  • No CVE is named in the snippet.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: authenticated root command execution

ProductAffected
Edimax Technology BR-6478ACfirmware v2.20 (BR6478AC_v2.20.bin)
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From the original article

Posted by disclosure via Fulldisclosure on Oct 20 0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2. 20. bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO wireless router from Edimax Technology Co.

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.