LEO beam allocation open to denial of service by injected terminals
Original title: Denial of Service Attacks on Beam Allocation in Large LEO Constellations
Demand-proportional sharing raised under-served users by up to 34%; equal sharing limited that increase to 13%.
Researchers model denial-of-service against beam allocation in large low-Earth-orbit constellations by injecting extra terminals that inflate demand. They test greedy and max-min-fair allocation with equal or demand-proportional intra-cell sharing, using demand satisfaction, coverage, and a service threshold. Greedy-proportional performed best before attacks but was most vulnerable. The sharing rule also changed which terminal placement caused the most damage.
Unconfirmed: Findings come from simulated attack heuristics, not reported operational incidents.
- Demand-proportional sharing increased under-served users by up to 34%.
- Equal sharing limited that increase to 13% under both algorithms.
- Concentrating injected terminals hurt demand-proportional sharing most.
- Equal sharing was worse when terminals were spread across lightly loaded cells.
- Max-min-fair allocation required the attacker to target more cells.
Impact: Denial of service against legitimate satellite users' capacity
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgWe study the vulnerability of beam allocation approaches in large low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations to adversarial demand inflation resulting in denial-of-service attacks.
By Ali Abbasi · arxiv.org
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.