Rapid7 Intelligence Wins the 2026 Péter Szőr Award for Outstanding Research

Some awards you're happy to receive, while others make you stop for a moment. Receiving the 2026 Péter Szőr Award this week at Virus Bulletin in Seville for our research, BPFdoor in Telecom Networks: Sleeper Cells in the Backbone, was of the latter kind.

Virus Bulletin created the award to honor Péter's life and work, and it recognizes outstanding technical security research: the rigorous, the deep, and the useful – exactly what he was known for himself. And as far as recognitions in our industry go, it's hard to top. I'm extremely proud.

What the Pèter Szőr Award means to us

I knew Péter, and early in my career, I learned from him. This was back when malware analysis meant staring at assembly, arguing about what a routine really did, and realizing hours later that your first theory was wrong. One memory came straight back when I heard about the award: going through Stuxnet together. For anyone in research at the time, that was the moment you knew the game had changed. Engineering, tradecraft, espionage and physical-world consequences, all in one package.

What stayed with me wasn't how much Péter knew, but rather his curiosity. He wanted to understand things, and then once he did, he wanted everyone else to understand too. Plenty of brilliant people in cybersecurity keep it to themselves, but the ones who leave a legacy make the people around them better.

Receiving an award that carries his name felt like one of those full-circle moments. 

The original research from Rapid7 Intelligence emerged after months of investigating stealthy access inside telecommunications environments. This wasn't malware dropped during a conventional intrusion, but long-term strategic positioning: passive backdoors, kernel-level capabilities and covert access, quietly settled into critical infrastructure and in no hurry whatsoever.

Telecom networks carry our communications, our identities and, increasingly, everything governments and businesses run on. So when an adversary sets up camp there, the impact goes well beyond one compromised machine or one unlucky company.

Virus Bulletin's community nomination noted that the work paired deep technical investigation with real-world impact, including long hours with agencies and CERTs around the world and tools, scripts, intelligence and detection capabilities for defenders. That's the part I'm happiest about, as this wasn't research for publication alone. Remember that a PDF has never stopped an intrusion.

Publishing research is a checkpoint, not the finish line

We're still doing the research. Since the original report, Rapid7 Intelligence has analyzed hundreds more samples, found previously undocumented BPFDoor variants, and tracked changes in the operators' tradecraft. Our follow-up work covered new httpShell and icmpShell variants built to make detection even harder. In further publications, we went beyond BPFDoor to additional Linux implants and infrastructure targeting telecom and network-edge environments, including AVERAT and techniques that hide in ordinary-looking traffic like SMTP. 

That's how this work goes. You find something, you share it, someone sends you another sample, a CERT spots something in their environment, an analyst notices the one odd function nobody looked at twice, and you're back down the rabbit hole. Anyone who thinks an initial report is the finish line has never received "just one more sample" at 4 p.m. on a Friday.

And truthfully, I also love that this happens in the open. From the outside, our industry looks like a cage match over attribution, naming conventions and whose acronym is cooler. But when something truly matters, researchers, vendors, CERTs and governments put that aside and share, because protecting people beats winning the naming argument.

This award belongs to the team: Rapid7 Intelligence

Research like this never belongs to just one or two people. It belongs to the analysts still staring at code after everyone else has gone home, the people who question an assumption because something doesn't add up, the people that keep the show running, and the detection engineers who turn findings into something defenders can use. It also belongs to the people collecting samples, maintaining infrastructure and correlating intelligence, and to the CERTs, agencies and peers who trusted us enough to share what they saw.

I'm proud of the Rapid7 Intelligence team, and not because of the trophy. I'm proud of why we got it: we took a hard problem, did the hard work, and then tried to make the result useful to someone else.

To the next generation of research

Today, the conversation has evolved to include autonomous agents, AI-generated malware and machine-speed attacks. Tomorrow it'll be something new. My motivation stays the same: I want to leave the digital world a little safer for the generations that come after us.

Somewhere right now, a young researcher is opening a debugger for the first time and wondering how on earth the thing works. Someone will investigate the Stuxnet of their generation, and someone will eventually sit in the chair I'm in now. Our job isn't just to detect today's attacks. It's to share what we learn, build tools, mentor people and make sure they start a few steps ahead of where we did.

Péter did that for our industry, and he did it for me.

Thank you to Virus Bulletin and our peers in the security community for this recognition, to everyone who contributed to the research, publicly or behind the scenes, and to Péter, who taught a young malware researcher that taking things apart is only half the job. The other half is making sure somebody else can learn from what you found.