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PRA-TLS: Attestation of a Client Application for TEE

arXiv cs.CRby Reina Sasaki ()1 min read1 · 1 read
AI summary · grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

PRA-TLS attests client applications that call TEE enclaves, prototyped on Intel SGX.

The paper proposes Portable Remote Attestation TLS (PRA-TLS) so a TEE enclave can verify the untrusted client application that calls it. A trusted attester daemon measures the host environment and application code at runtime and supplies evidence to a remote verifier. The enclave continues only when the environment and code match the expected state. The authors define attack models, prove the protocol with Tamarin, and prototype it on Intel SGX.

Key facts
  • PRA-TLS attests the client application that invokes a TEE enclave.
  • A trusted attester daemon measures the host environment and application code at runtime.
  • Security was formally evaluated with the Tamarin Prover.
  • A prototype on Intel SGX was implemented and benchmarked.
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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are secure foundations for protecting sensitive information and executing computations over confidential data. Processing in an isolated execution environment (enclave) is invoked by an untrusted application in the Rich Execution Environment (REE). Then the enclave returns the execution results to the untrusted application.

arXiv cs.CR

By Reina Sasaki · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.