Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour

Cryptominers falsify NVIDIA GPU telemetry on compromised Linux servers

Original title: Hackers Manipulate NVIDIA GPU Monitoring to Conceal Cryptocurrency Mining on Compromised Linux Servers

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read1
Part of a story covered by 3 sourcesREF3364 hid Linux GPU cryptominers behind fake 0% utilizationMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

REF3364 reached three Linux GPU hosts through an exposed, unauthenticated Ray job agent, then hid miners with a library wrapper and kernel rootkit.

Elastic Security Labs describes REF3364, a Linux cryptomining intrusion that abused an internet-reachable Ray job agent even though the dashboard listened only on loopback. After unauthenticated job submission, the attacker ran nvidia-smi, opened a Python reverse shell, added an SSH key, gained root, and staged a toolkit under /opt/vadi_. SANSAR, a Rust orchestrator, ran XMRig as kurt and SRBMiner-MULTI as tilki, wrapped libnvidia-ml.so.1 so utilization read zero, and loaded the acpi_thermal_mgr.ko rootkit. Command paths used Tor and a separate Ethereum-discovered TCP controller.

Unconfirmed: Elastic's findings do not identify how privilege escalation to root occurred.

Key facts
  • Probing appeared on October 22, 2026; a reverse shell followed on October 25.
  • The NVML wrapper reports GPU use as zero and randomizes temperature and power.
  • acpi_thermal_mgr.ko hides processes, files, and sockets and can reload via DKMS.
  • netns finds a controller IPv4 address through Ethereum, then connects on TCP 8080.
  • How the attacker escalated from the Ray session owner to root is not identified.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Root on Linux GPU hosts and concealed cryptomining

ProductAffected
Anyscale Ray—
NVIDIA Management Library (libnvidia-ml.so.1)—
What to do
  1. 1.Correlate Ray job submissions, SSH keys, NVML library changes, and DKMS or boot-image artifacts.
  2. 2.Do not treat zero GPU utilization alone as evidence a host is clean.
  3. 3.Hunt for sansar, kurt (XMRig), tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI), and acpi_thermal_mgr.ko.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
sha25600c9ac44291f83c72d54302e99d155a3e26d02225a3e516764d5833a99657c9epulated simultaneously. IOCs Observable Type Name Reference 00c9ac44291f83c72d54302e99d155a3e26d02225a3e516764d5833a99657c9e SHA-256 sansar Miner orchestrator 96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31
sha25696fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad4625a3e516764d5833a99657c9e SHA-256 sansar Miner orchestrator 96fc528ca5e7d1c2b3add5e31b8797cb126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46 SHA-256 kurt Xmrig 6.25.0 acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7
sha256acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7c9f1a123895ac56dc8a289beb2fb5b7b126f704976c8fbeaecdbf0aa4309ad46 SHA-256 kurt Xmrig 6.25.0 acc706afc9322a3eae1ef49049749e0a7c9f1a123895ac56dc8a289beb2fb5b7 SHA-256 tilki SRBMiner-MULTI Note: IP addresses and domains

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

A Linux cryptomining intrusion in which attackers falsified NVIDIA GPU telemetry, concealed mining processes with a kernel rootkit, and maintained separate command channels through Tor and Ethereum. Tracked as REF3364, the operation deployed a coordinated toolkit across three Linux GPU hosts after abusing an internet-exposed Ray job agent. Its layered concealment targets both operating-system visibility […]

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.