MemSentry: A Framework for Detecting Persistent Memory Poisoning in Agentic AI
MemSentry intercepts persistent-memory writes in agentic AI to catch memory poisoning, reaching 91.7% accuracy with SBERT+LR classification.
Memory poisoning lets adversaries plant crafted content in an agent's long-term memory to suppress security alerts, enable privilege escalation, or override policies without modifying model weights or system prompts. The paper presents MemSentry, a configuration-driven framework that evaluates proposed persistent-memory writes on source trust, semantic risk, attack radius over a dependency DAG, access risk, and a signed security-state delta to issue deterministic Accept, Review, or Quarantine decisions. Across 1,000 GPT-4-generated scenarios on a 20-asset dependency DAG, SBERT+LR achieved 91.7% accuracy and 0.908 macro-F1, all four classifiers detected 100% of external quarantine-class threats, and verified-insider writes are escalated for human review rather than auto-quarantined.
- Memory poisoning alters agent behavior without touching weights or prompts
- Deterministic Accept/Review/Quarantine decisions on persistent-memory writes
- SBERT+LR is the best classifier: 91.7% accuracy, 0.908 macro-F1
- All four classifiers detect 100% of external quarantine-class threats
- Verified insider writes escalated to human review, not auto-quarantined
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgAgentic AI systems with persistent memory introduce a distinct attack surface known as memory poisoning, in which adversarially crafted content is stored in long-term memory and subsequently influences future agent behavior.
By Ayan Roy · arxiv.org
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