China-Linked Silk Typhoon Expands Cyber Attacks to IT Supply Chains for Initial Access
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-26855 | Unauthenticated SSRF/RCE in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyLogon) CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery flaw (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send specially crafted HTTP requests and have the Exchange server process them as itself, disclosing sensitive session information. When chained with sibling Exchange flaws (the 'ProxyLogon' chain), it yields authentication bypass and arbitrary file write, escalating to full remote code execution with SYSTEM-level privileges on the on-premises Exchange server. Any organization running an affected on-premises Exchange server reachable over HTTP/HTTPS (typically outbound webmail) is exposed; Exchange Online was not affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild at large scale: the flaw was mass-exploited beginning in early 2021 (notably by the HAFNIUM group), is on the CISA KEV with documented ransomware use, and has a maximum EPSS score of 100% (100th percentile), despite no public PoC listing. Do: Apply the vendor's March 2021 Exchange security updates (or later cumulative updates) immediately, per the CISA required action; until patched, limit Exchange (ECP/OWA) exposure to the internet via firewall/VPN rules. Hunt for compromise: review IIS logs for unrecognized authenticated activity against FrontEnd HttpProxy endpoints, and check for malicious files or webshells under inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client, given the known ransomware use. | 9.1 group max | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×4 |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-premises deployments; tens of thousands of internet-exposed Exchange servers | |
| CVE-2021-44228 | JNDI Injection Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell) Apache Log4j2, an extremely widely used Java logging library, fails to protect its JNDI lookup feature against attacker-controlled JNDI-related endpoints (CWE-20, CWE-502), so crafted text processed by the logger causes the Java runtime to fetch and load attacker-supplied objects, leading to remote code execution. The flaw is triggered whenever attacker-controlled input reaches the logging API and is parsed for JNDI lookups, a pattern common in web servers and enterprise Java applications that log user-supplied fields such as headers or form values. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the affected application, giving attackers a foothold for lateral movement, data theft, and ransomware deployment. Any Java application or product that ships or bundles an affected Apache Log4j2 release is exposed, making this one of the most broadly deployed vulnerabilities ever disclosed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Inventory all Java applications and dependencies for Apache Log4j2 and apply the vendor's patched updates, or remove affected assets from the network, as required by CISA's KEV catalog. Where updates are not yet available, use the temporary mitigations in CISA's ED-22-02 recommended-mitigation guidance, such as disabling message lookups, only until patches are applied. Prioritize internet-facing and business-critical systems and hunt for exploitation activity given known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×9 |
| masshundreds of millions of Java applications/devices, with hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed services | |
| CVE-2023-3519 | Unauthenticated RCE in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway CVE-2023-3519 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) unauthenticated remote code execution flaw caused by improper code-injection handling (CWE-94) in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. A remote attacker with no credentials can trigger it by sending crafted requests to an appliance configured as a Gateway (VPN/ICA proxy/RDP proxy) or AAA authentication virtual server, gaining arbitrary code execution on the appliance. Exploitation typically yields a foothold behind the VPN edge — access to internal networks, credential theft, and follow-on activity such as espionage or ransomware deployment. Any organization running unpatched NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, especially internet-facing remote-access endpoints, is affected; NetScaler is one of the most widely deployed enterprise VPN/ADC platforms. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2023-07-19 with known ransomware use, EPSS estimates a 99.7% exploitation probability, and researchers have linked activity to China-nexus espionage (Silk Typhoon) and ransomware operations. Do: Immediately upgrade internet-facing NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances to the fixed builds in Citrix's advisory (14.1-8.50+, 13.1-49.13+, 13.0-82.45+, 12.1-55.300+, including FIPS/NDcPP equivalents) — per CISA KEV, apply these mitigations or discontinue use if patching is unavailable. Confirm whether each appliance is configured as a Gateway or AAA virtual server (only those are affected), and hunt for compromise — unexpected configuration changes, unfamiliar accounts, webshells, or anomalous VPN sessions — rotating credentials on any suspected compromise. | 9.8 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed NetScaler Gateway/ADC appliances (order 10k-100k at disclosure), serving hundreds of thousands to millions of downstream… | |
| CVE-2024-3400 | Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent. Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled | |
| CVE-2025-0282 | Unauthenticated RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways CVE-2025-0282 is a stack-based buffer overflow (CWE-121) in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and ZTA Gateways, reachable by unauthenticated network input. An attacker can trigger it remotely by sending crafted, unauthenticated traffic to a vulnerable gateway, overwriting stack memory and gaining code execution under the appliance's context. Successful exploitation yields unauthenticated remote code execution on the device, giving the attacker control of the VPN/secure-access gateway and a foothold into the protected network. Organizations running any of the affected Ivanti secure-access products are exposed; the source data specifies no version ranges, so defenders should consult Ivanti's advisory for exact affected and fixed releases. The flaw is being actively exploited: it was added to CISA KEV on 2025-01-08 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile), despite no public PoC being known. Do: Apply the patched releases identified in Ivanti's advisory and follow CISA's required action: hunt for signs of compromise, remediate if indicators are found, and apply updates before returning any device to service. Because exploitation is active and ransomware use is known, treat any appliance that was internet-reachable before patching as potentially compromised (check integrity, rotate credentials). Exact fixed versions were not included in the source data, so verify the correct update path for your branch (including older Connect Secure/Policy Secure releases) against Ivanti's bulletin. | 9.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×3 |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed appliances (likely 100,000+ total deployments including internal-only gateways) |
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Ravie LakshmananMar 05, 2025Network Security / Data Breach
The China-linked threat actor behind the zero-day exploitation of security flaws in Microsoft Exchange servers in January 2021 has shifted its tactics to target the information technology (IT) supply chain as a means to obtain initial access to corporate networks.
That's according to new findings from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence team, which said the Silk Typhoon (formerly Hafnium) hacking group is now targeting IT solutions like remote management tools and cloud applications to obtain a foothold.
"After successfully compromising a victim, Silk Typhoon uses the stolen keys and credentials to infiltrate customer networks where they can then abuse a variety of deployed applications, including Microsoft services and others, to achieve their espionage objectives," the tech giant said in a report published today.
The adversarial collective is assessed to be "well-resourced and technically efficient," swiftly putting to use exploits for zero-day vulnerabilities in edge devices for opportunistic attacks that allow them to scale their attacks across a wide range of sectors and regions.
This includes information technology (IT) services and infrastructure, remote monitoring and management (RMM) companies, managed service providers (MSPs) and affiliates, healthcare, legal services, higher education, defense, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), energy, and others located in the United States and throughout the world.
Silk Typhoon has also been observed relying on various web shells to achieve command execution, persistence, and data exfiltration from victim environments. It's also said to have demonstrated a keen understanding of cloud infrastructure, further allowing it to move laterally and harvest data of interest.
At least since late 2024, the attackers have been linked to a new set of methods, chief among which concerns the abuse of stolen API keys and credentials associated with privilege access management (PAM), cloud app providers, and cloud data management companies to conduct supply chain compromises of downstream customers.
"Leveraging access obtained via the API key, the actor performed reconnaissance and data collection on targeted devices via an admin account," Microsoft said, adding targets of this activity mainly encompassed the state and local government, as well as the IT sector.
Some of the other initial access routes adopted by Silk Typhoon entail the zero-day exploitation of a security flaw in Ivanti Pulse Connect VPN (CVE-2025-0282) and the use of password spray attacks using enterprise credentials surfaced from leaked passwords on public repositories hosted on GitHub and others.
Also exploited by the threat actor as a zero-day are -
- CVE-2024-3400, a command injection flaw in Palo Alto Networks firewalls
- CVE-2023-3519, An unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting Citrix NetScaler Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and NetScaler Gateway
- CVE-2021-26855 (aka ProxyLogon), CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065, a set of vulnerabilities impacting Microsoft Exchange Server
A successful initial access is followed by the threat actor taking steps to move laterally from on-premises environments to cloud environments, and leverage OAuth applications with administrative permissions to perform email, OneDrive, and SharePoint data exfiltration via the MSGraph API.
In an attempt to obfuscate the origin of their malicious activities, Silk Typhoon relies on a "CovertNetwork" comprising compromised Cyberoam appliances, Zyxel routers, and QNAP devices, a hallmark of several Chinese state-sponsored actors.
"During recent activities and historical exploitation of these appliances, Silk Typhoon utilized a variety of web shells to maintain persistence and to allow the actors to remotely access victim environments," Microsoft said.
Update
Threat intelligence firm GreyNoise, in a report published on March 6, 2025, said it detected active exploitation by more than 90 unique threat IPs in the past 24 hours across CVEs linked to the Silk Typhoon actor -
- CVE-2021-26855 - A total of 1,191 unique IP addresses from Singapore, France, Germany, the United States, and China
- CVE-2021-44228 - A total of 435 unique IP addresses from the United States, Iran, India, Germany, and Japan
- CVE-2024-3400 - A total of 121 unique IP addresses from the United States, Singapore, Germany, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong
In light ongoing exploitation activity, it's important that customers move quickly to apply the necessary patches, disable unnecessary internet-facing services, implement multi-factor authentication (MFA), and enforce network segmentation to restrict lateral movement efforts.
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