Salt Typhoon Exploits Flaws in Edge Network Devices to Breach 600 Organizations Worldwide
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-0171 | Unauthenticated RCE/DoS in Cisco IOS & IOS XE Smart Install CVE-2018-0171 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) buffer-overflow vulnerability in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE, caused by improper validation of packet data (CWE-20, CWE-787). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can trigger it by simply sending a crafted Smart Install message to TCP port 4786 on an affected device, with no credentials or user interaction required. A successful exploit can cause a device reload, an indefinite loop that triggers a watchdog crash, or arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker full control of the switch or router. Any IOS or IOS XE device running the Smart Install service is affected — a configuration commonly present on Catalyst switches — and devices exposed to the internet on TCP 4786 are at direct risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and both Russian (Static Tundra, FSB-linked) and Chinese (Salt Typhoon) state-sponsored actors have exploited it to compromise unpatched, often end-of-life, Cisco network devices at hundreds of organizations worldwide. Do: Upgrade IOS/IOS XE to a fixed release per Cisco's advisory (Bug ID CSCvg76186); for end-of-life hardware that cannot be patched, plan replacement given active nation-state targeting of unpatched devices. If Smart Install is not in use, disable it with 'no vstack'; otherwise restrict TCP port 4786 with ACLs to trusted management hosts. Audit internet-facing switches and routers for Smart Install enabled and TCP 4786 exposed, and prioritize those devices for remediation. | 9.8 | 99% | KEV |
| mass≈250,000+ internet-exposed devices with TCP/4786 open, on top of a multi-million-device IOS/IOS XE installed base | |
| CVE-2023-20198 | Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation in Cisco IOS XE Web UI (Actively Exploited) CVE-2023-20198 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) unauthenticated privilege escalation flaw in the web UI of Cisco IOS XE software, triggered by sending crafted network requests to the exposed web management interface. An attacker with no credentials can use the flaw to gain initial access and issue a privilege 15 command, creating a local user with normal login access; the attacker then chained CVE-2023-20273 (CVSS 7.2) to elevate that account to root and write an implant to the file system. Successful exploitation yields full administrative control of the device, including persistence via the planted implant, on Cisco IOS XE devices with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or untrusted networks, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley Stratix 5200 and 5800 switches running IOS XE. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2023-10-16 with a BOD 23-02 directive, EPSS stands at 99.6% (100th percentile), and ongoing campaigns (including the 'BADCANDY' activity flagged by Australia's ASD and Cisco-related telecom intrusions attributed to Salt Typhoon) have been reported. Do: Upgrade affected devices to the fixed releases listed in Cisco's advisory (use Cisco's Software Checker) and, as immediate mitigation, disable the web UI or restrict it to trusted networks/addresses only. Check for compromise by looking for unexpected local user accounts and the implant artifacts Cisco identified (unexpected cisco_tac_alarm.log and cisco_tac.log files in /tmp or /usr/binos/conf), and immediately report positive findings to CISA per BOD 23-02. Keep in mind that patching alone does not remove a root implant, so devices with evidence of compromise should be reimaged or otherwise cleaned per vendor instructions. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV |
| large≈40,000–50,000 internet-exposed IOS XE devices at the time of disclosure (public scan data), within an IOS XE install base in the millions | |
| CVE-2023-20273 | Authenticated Command Injection (Root) in Cisco IOS XE Web UI CVE-2023-20273 is an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web UI feature of Cisco IOS XE Software, caused by insufficient input validation. An authenticated, remote attacker triggers it by sending crafted input to the web UI, and a successful exploit injects commands that run on the underlying operating system with root privileges, yielding full device compromise (in the October 2023 mass-exploitation campaign it was typically chained with the unauthenticated CVE-2023-20198 to obtain initial access and install a persistent implant). Any Cisco IOS XE device with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or an untrusted network is affected; this data does not specify the affected release ranges, which are enumerated in Cisco's advisory. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV on 2023-10-23 with BOD 23-02 response actions, EPSS is ~90% (100th percentile), and IOS XE edge devices remain recurring targets of Chinese-nexus espionage campaigns (e.g., Salt Typhoon activity against telecoms). Do: Upgrade affected devices to a fixed IOS XE release per Cisco's advisory; as an interim mitigation, disable the HTTP/HTTPS server (ip http server / ip https server) or restrict Web UI access to trusted hosts only. Per BOD 23-02, hunt for compromise on any exposed device — check for unexpected level-15 local accounts and the implant.lua backdoor in flash memory — and immediately report positive findings to CISA. | 7.2 | 90% | KEV |
| mass≈100,000+ internet-exposed IOS XE devices (public scans observed ~40,000+ compromised within days of disclosure) | |
| CVE-2024-21887 +1 in the same advisory: …46805 | Command Injection RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances contain a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in their web components, triggered when an authenticated administrator sends crafted requests to the appliance. The bug can be chained with the separate authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve the same result. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary commands and code on the appliance, providing a foothold into the networks behind the VPN or network access control gateway. Any organization running these appliances, typically enterprises and government agencies often deployed directly on the internet perimeter, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-10 with known ransomware use and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, although no public proof-of-concept is available. Do: Apply Ivanti's mitigations or patched builds immediately per vendor instructions, addressing the chained authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805 at the same time, and discontinue or restrict use of any appliance for which mitigations are unavailable, especially if it is internet-facing. Because exploitation with ransomware use is known, assume compromise is possible: review appliance web logs for suspicious requests and run Ivanti's integrity-checking guidance to verify appliance images before and after remediation. Where feasible, restrict direct internet exposure of the appliance web interface and monitor for further vendor advisories. | 9.1 group max | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of appliances (roughly 20,000-30,000 internet-exposed ICS gateways at disclosure; total deployed base likely higher) | |
| CVE-2024-3400 | Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent. Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled |
Full article1,093 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse
The China-linked advanced persistent threat (APT) actor known as Salt Typhoon has continued its attacks targeting networks across the world, including organizations in the telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure sectors.
"While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks," according to a joint cybersecurity advisory published Wednesday. "These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks."
The bulletin, courtesy of authorities from 13 countries, said the malicious activity has been linked to three Chinese entities, Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co., Ltd., and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co., Ltd.
These companies, the agencies said, provide cyber-related products and services to China's intelligence services, with the data stolen from the intrusions, specifically those against telecoms and Internet service providers (ISPs), providing Beijing with the ability to identify and track their targets' communications and movements globally.
The countries that have co-sealed the security advisory include Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.
Brett Leatherman, head of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cyber Division, said the Salt Typhoon group has been active since at least 2019, engaging in a persistent espionage campaign aimed at "breaching global telecommunications privacy and security norms."
In a standalone alert issued today, Dutch intelligence and security services MIVD and AIVD said while organizations in the country "did not receive the same degree of attention from the Salt Typhoon hackers as those in the U.S.," the threat actors gained access to routers of smaller ISPs and hosting providers. However, there is no evidence the hackers penetrated these networks further.
"Since at least 2021, this activity has targeted organisations in critical sectors including government, telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure globally, with a cluster of activity observed in the U.K.," the National Cyber Security Centre said.
According to The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the hacking crew has expanded its targeting focus to other sectors and regions, attacking no less than 600 organizations, including 200 in the U.S., and 80 countries.
Salt Typhoon, which overlaps with activity tracked as GhostEmperor, Operator Panda, RedMike, and UNC5807, has been observed obtaining initial access through the exploitation of exposed network edge devices from Cisco (CVE-2018-0171, CVE-2023-20198, and CVE-2023-20273), Ivanti (CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887), and Palo Alto Networks (CVE-2024-3400).
However, the agencies pointed out these vulnerabilities are not "exhaustive" and that the threat actors may also go after other devices such as Fortinet firewalls, Juniper firewalls, Microsoft Exchange, Nokia routers and switches, Sierra Wireless devices, and Sonicwall firewalls, among others for initial access.
"The APT actors may target edge devices regardless of who owns a particular device," the agencies noted. "Devices owned by entities that do not align with the actors’ core targets of interest still present opportunities for use in attack pathways into targets of interest."
The compromised devices are then leveraged to pivot into other networks, in some cases even modifying the device's configuration and adding a generic routing encapsulation (GRE) tunnel for persistent access and data exfiltration.
Persistent access to target networks is accomplished by altering Access Control Lists (ACLs) to add IP addresses under their control, opening standard and non-standard ports, and running commands in an on-box Linux container on supported Cisco networking devices to stage tools, process data locally, and move laterally within the environment.
Also put to use by the attackers are authentication protocols like Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+) to enable lateral movement across network devices, while simultaneously conducting extensive discovery actions and capturing network traffic containing credentials via compromised routers to burrow deeper into the networks.
"The APT actors collected PCAPs using native tooling on the compromised system, with the primary objective likely being to capture TACACS+ traffic over TCP port 49," the agencies said. "TACACS+ traffic is used for authentication, often for administration of network equipment and including highly privileged network administrators' accounts and credentials, likely enabling the actors to compromise additional accounts and perform lateral movement."
On top of that, Salt Typhoon has been observed enabling the sshd_operns service on Cisco IOS XR devices to create a local user and grant it sudo privileges to obtain root on the host OS after logging in via TCP/57722.
Google-owned Mandiant, which was one of the many industry partners that contributed to the advisory, stated the threat actor's familiarity with telecommunications systems offers them a unique advantage, giving them an upper hand when it comes to defense evasion.
It's worth pointing out that UNC5807 is a threat cluster that's distinct from UNC2286, which, in the past, has been identified as overlapping with FamousSparrow and GhostEmperor, according to Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant.
"While some public reporting has associated both UNC5807 and UNC2286 with the 'GhostEmperor' alias, Google assesses these to be distinct threat clusters," Dan Perez, China Mission Lead at GTIG, told The Hacker News. "Our analysis is based on distinctions in their operational tradecraft and motivations."
"The toolsets used by each group are different. UNC5807 has been observed using a specific and limited set of malware families. In contrast, UNC2286 employs a much broader and more varied arsenal of malicious tools. Additionally their objectives are different. We have observed UNC2286 conducting financially motivated attacks, including ransomware deployment and extortion. The activities attributed to UNC5807, however, are consistent with espionage operations."
"An ecosystem of contractors, academics, and other facilitators is at the heart of Chinese cyber espionage," John Hultquist, Chief Analyst at GTIG, told the publication. Contractors are used to build tools and valuable exploits as well as carry out the dirty work of intrusion operations. They have been instrumental in the rapid evolution of these operations and growing them to an unprecedented scale."
"In addition to targeting telecommunications, reported targeting of hospitality and transportation by this actor could be used to closely surveil individuals. Information from these sectors can be used to develop a full picture of who someone is talking to, where they are, and where they are going."
(The story was updated after publication to make it clear that the threat actors are targeting and may target a broad range of edge network appliances.)
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