Huntress shows how to detect extended MS-SNTP timeroasting
Original title: Detecting Timeroasting the Hard Way
Modern Windows sends a 120-byte HMAC-SHA512 authenticator by default, and size alone is not an attack signal.
Huntress researcher Andrew Schwartz reversed netlogon.dll and w32time.dll from a fully patched Windows Server 2025 domain controller to recover undocumented extended MS-SNTP cryptography. Timeroasting asks a domain controller to return a password-derived MAC for any computer or trust account without authentication, then cracks it offline. He published a reference implementation and a hashcat module for the extended form. Detection should flag requests whose RID is not the sender's own machine account.
Unconfirmed: The post does not report confirmed timeroasting incidents in customer environments.
- Legacy packets are 68 bytes with MD5; hashcat mode 31300 covers only that form.
- Extended MACs use SP800-108 key derivation and HMAC-SHA512.
- The attack creates no 4768, 4769, 4624, or 4776 logon events.
- Microsoft Defender for Identity does not catch the unauthenticated sweep, Huntress says.
- SignatureAuthAllowed=0 forces clients back to the legacy authenticator.
Impact: Offline cracking of weak computer and trust account secrets
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Windows MS-SNTP | — |
- 1.Log UDP/123 requests to domain controllers and alert when the requested RID is not the sender's.
- 2.Do not treat packet size alone as proof of timeroasting.
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| md5 | 41aed72cec76816423703d8e545eea31 | : Summer2026! (example only, not a real account) NThash : 41aed72cec76816423703d8e545eea31 RID : 1104 (arbitrary; the RID is just KDF context) ha |
| md5 | f3c43f1f39a61012e634983008213633 | rm captured off the same DC (hashcat 31300): 1000:$sntp-ms$f3c43f1f39a61012e634983008213633$1c0400e90000000c000002a6564d5450ee667af63d863d9cee667976000 |
From the original article
14 min read at huntress.comTimeroasting leaves no authentication log, but it is not invisible. I reverse MS-SNTP's two authenticator forms to build detection that packet size cannot fool.
huntress.com
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