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Huntress shows how to detect extended MS-SNTP timeroasting

Original title: Detecting Timeroasting the Hard Way

Huntress ()14 min read1
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Modern Windows sends a 120-byte HMAC-SHA512 authenticator by default, and size alone is not an attack signal.

Huntress researcher Andrew Schwartz reversed netlogon.dll and w32time.dll from a fully patched Windows Server 2025 domain controller to recover undocumented extended MS-SNTP cryptography. Timeroasting asks a domain controller to return a password-derived MAC for any computer or trust account without authentication, then cracks it offline. He published a reference implementation and a hashcat module for the extended form. Detection should flag requests whose RID is not the sender's own machine account.

Unconfirmed: The post does not report confirmed timeroasting incidents in customer environments.

Key facts
  • Legacy packets are 68 bytes with MD5; hashcat mode 31300 covers only that form.
  • Extended MACs use SP800-108 key derivation and HMAC-SHA512.
  • The attack creates no 4768, 4769, 4624, or 4776 logon events.
  • Microsoft Defender for Identity does not catch the unauthenticated sweep, Huntress says.
  • SignatureAuthAllowed=0 forces clients back to the legacy authenticator.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Offline cracking of weak computer and trust account secrets

ProductAffected
Microsoft Windows MS-SNTP—
What to do
  1. 1.Log UDP/123 requests to domain controllers and alert when the requested RID is not the sender's.
  2. 2.Do not treat packet size alone as proof of timeroasting.
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Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
md541aed72cec76816423703d8e545eea31: Summer2026! (example only, not a real account) NThash : 41aed72cec76816423703d8e545eea31 RID : 1104 (arbitrary; the RID is just KDF context) ha
md5f3c43f1f39a61012e634983008213633rm captured off the same DC (hashcat 31300): 1000:$sntp-ms$f3c43f1f39a61012e634983008213633$1c0400e90000000c000002a6564d5450ee667af63d863d9cee667976000

From the original article

14 min read at huntress.com

Timeroasting leaves no authentication log, but it is not invisible. I reverse MS-SNTP's two authenticator forms to build detection that packet size cannot fool.

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.