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From Log4j to IIS, China’s Hackers Turn Legacy Bugs into Global Espionage Tools

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2017-17562
Unauthenticated RCE in Embedthis GoAhead Web Server via CGI LD_PRELOAD injection

Embedthis GoAhead web servers before version 3.6.5 initialize the environment of forked CGI scripts using untrusted HTTP request parameters in the cgiHandler function (cgi.c), which allows an attacker to inject dynamic-loader variables such as LD_PRELOAD when CGI is enabled and the CGI program is dynamically linked. By POSTing a shared-object payload in the request body and referencing it through /proc/self/fd/0, the attacker causes the glibc dynamic linker to load and execute their code, resulting in unauthenticated remote code execution with the privileges of the web server. The attack requires no privileges or user interaction, but only works on targets with CGI enabled and a dynamically linked CGI binary, which limits the exploitable share of GoAhead's very large embedded-device footprint. Affected deployments include Embedthis GoAhead prior to 3.6.5 across embedded and IoT devices, as well as Oracle Integrated Lights Out Manager (ILOM) service processors that ship the affected GoAhead code. The flaw is confirmed exploited in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on 2021-12-10, and EPSS assigns a 96.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Upgrade Embedthis GoAhead to version 3.6.5 or later per vendor instructions, and apply the ILOM updates Oracle provides in its security advisories for Integrated Lights Out Manager. Where upgrading is not immediately possible, disable CGI or ensure CGI programs are statically linked so LD_PRELOAD cannot be abused, and prioritize patching internet-exposed devices. Because this vulnerability is on the CISA KEV catalog, use asset inventories and exposure scans to confirm no remaining unpatched GoAhead instances are reachable from the internet.

8.196% KEV PoC ×3
  • embedthis goahead all versions before 3.6.5
  • oracle integrated lights out manager (ILOM)
mass~hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed GoAhead/IoT devices (only the subset with CGI enabled and dynamically linked binaries is actually exploitable)
CVE-2017-9805
XML Deserialization RCE in Apache Struts 2 REST Plugin

CVE-2017-9805 is an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the REST plugin of Apache Struts 2, which uses the XStream library to deserialize XML request payloads without any type filtering. An attacker triggers it by sending a crafted XML payload to an endpoint handled by the REST plugin, causing the payload to be deserialized into arbitrary objects. Successful exploitation yields remote code execution on the server with the privileges of the web application, typically enough to fully take over the host. Struts 2.1.1 through 2.3.x before 2.3.34 and 2.5.x before 2.5.13 are affected, including products from Cisco and NetApp that bundle vulnerable Struts versions. The flaw has a public proof-of-concept exploit, is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and was reported as under active exploitation after its 2017 disclosure, although the Apache Foundation disputed suggestions that this specific flaw was used in the Equifax breach.

Do: Upgrade Apache Struts to 2.3.34, 2.5.13, or later, or apply the fixed updates for any Cisco or NetApp product that embeds Struts per their advisories. If patching is not immediate, remove or disable the REST plugin, or restrict the XML content types it accepts. Inventory internet-facing applications for Struts REST endpoints and hunt for suspicious XML POSTs, since the CVE is on the CISA KEV list and was reported as actively exploited.

8.199% KEV PoC
  • Apache Struts 2 (REST plugin) 2.1.1 through 2.3.x before 2.3.34 and 2.5.x before 2.5.13
  • Cisco Digital Media Manager Bundled Struts within affected ranges (2.1.1 to 2.3.33 or 2.5.0 to 2.5.12); exact product versions per Cisco advisory
  • Cisco Hosted Collaboration Solution Bundled Struts within affected ranges (2.1.1 to 2.3.33 or 2.5.0 to 2.5.12); exact product versions per Cisco advisory
  • +4 more
mass~100,000-300,000+ internet-exposed Struts servers and applications (only a subset exposing the vulnerable REST plugin); embedded Cisco/NetApp deployments…
CVE-2021-44228
JNDI Injection Remote Code Execution in Apache Log4j2 (Log4Shell)

Apache Log4j2, an extremely widely used Java logging library, fails to protect its JNDI lookup feature against attacker-controlled JNDI-related endpoints (CWE-20, CWE-502), so crafted text processed by the logger causes the Java runtime to fetch and load attacker-supplied objects, leading to remote code execution. The flaw is triggered whenever attacker-controlled input reaches the logging API and is parsed for JNDI lookups, a pattern common in web servers and enterprise Java applications that log user-supplied fields such as headers or form values. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution under the privileges of the affected application, giving attackers a foothold for lateral movement, data theft, and ransomware deployment. Any Java application or product that ships or bundles an affected Apache Log4j2 release is exposed, making this one of the most broadly deployed vulnerabilities ever disclosed. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-12-10 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Inventory all Java applications and dependencies for Apache Log4j2 and apply the vendor's patched updates, or remove affected assets from the network, as required by CISA's KEV catalog. Where updates are not yet available, use the temporary mitigations in CISA's ED-22-02 recommended-mitigation guidance, such as disabling message lookups, only until patches are applied. Prioritize internet-facing and business-critical systems and hunt for exploitation activity given known ransomware use.

10.0100% KEV ransomware PoC ×9
  • Apache Log4j2
masshundreds of millions of Java applications/devices, with hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed services
CVE-2022-26134
Unauthenticated OGNL Injection RCE in Atlassian Confluence Server/Data Center

Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center contain an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw caused by improper neutralization of expression-language (OGNL) input (CWE-917): an attacker with network access to the application can submit a crafted request that is evaluated as an expression and executed by the server. Successful exploitation lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker run arbitrary code with the privileges of the Confluence process, without any credentials. All organizations running self-managed Confluence Server or Data Center are affected, particularly instances exposed to the internet; Confluence Cloud is not listed among the affected products. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2022-06-02 with ransomware use marked as known, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). CVSS has not yet been scored in this data, but the KEV listing and known ransomware use make unpatched, internet-facing instances a top-priority patching target.

Do: Immediately upgrade to the patched Confluence release specified in Atlassian's 2022-06-02 security advisory, and until patched follow the CISA required action to block all internet traffic to and from affected instances. Because in-the-wild exploitation and ransomware use are confirmed, also hunt for compromise indicators on both patched and unpatched hosts, such as webshells, unexpected child processes of the Confluence service, and unusual outbound connections.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Atlassian Confluence Server
  • Atlassian Confluence Data Center
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed instances (public scan counts of roughly 60,000-90,000 Confluence Server/Data Center hosts around the June 2022…
CVE-2025-8088
WinRAR Path Traversal (CVE-2025-8088) Enables Arbitrary Code Execution

A path traversal flaw (CWE-35) in the Windows version of WinRAR allows attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution by delivering a specially crafted archive file that writes outside the expected location when it is opened or processed. Because the CVSS 4.0 vector indicates a local attack requiring user interaction, victims are typically infected by extracting or previewing a malicious archive received via phishing, a malicious download, or another delivery channel. A successful attacker gains the privileges of the user running WinRAR, providing an initial foothold that has been used for both espionage and ransomware operations. Anyone running the Windows version of WinRAR — one of the most widely deployed Windows desktop utilities — is affected, and CPE data additionally lists dtSearch as an affected vendor. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild by nation-state actors (e.g., the China-linked Amaranth-Dragon group per related reporting) and criminal actors including ransomware operators; the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2025-08-12 and carries a near-maximal 94.6% EPSS score.

Do: Update WinRAR to the latest patched release from RARLAB on all Windows endpoints, prioritizing remediation per CISA KEV and BOD 22-01 requirements, and verify that dtSearch deployments bundling the affected component are also updated. Because exploitation requires a user to open or extract a crafted archive, warn users to treat unexpected archive files delivered by email or download with suspicion. Given confirmed ransomware use, hunt across user workstations — not just exposed servers — for suspicious archive-based infections and confirm the patched WinRAR version is installed.

8.495% KEV ransomware
  • RARLAB WinRAR
  • dtsearch
masshundreds of millions of Windows users/devices (est.; RARLAB has historically claimed user counts in the hundreds of millions)

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainasp.netweb shell capabilities. "REF3927 abuses publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys to compromise IIS servers and deploy TOLLBOOTH
domaingleeze.comdesigned to establish contact with a remote server ("mimosa.gleeze[.]com"). BartBlaze told The Hacker News that the activity dates
Full article1,231 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

A China-linked threat actor has been attributed to a cyber attack targeting an U.S. non-profit organization with an aim to establish long-term persistence, as part of broader activity aimed at U.S. entities that are linked to or involved in policy issues.

The organization, according to a report from Broadcom's Symantec and Carbon Black teams, is "active in attempting to influence U.S. government policy on international issues." The attackers managed to gain access to the network for several weeks in April 2025.

The first sign of activity occurred on April 5, 2025, when mass scanning efforts were detected against a server by leveraging various well-known exploits, including CVE-2022-26134 (Atlassian), CVE-2021-44228 (Apache Log4j), CVE-2017-9805 (Apache Struts), and CVE-2017-17562 (GoAhead Web Server).

Symantec and Carbon Black told The Hacker News that there is no indication that these exploitation efforts were successful. It's suspected that the attackers ultimately gained initial access with a brute-force or credential stuffing attack.

No further actions were recorded until April 16, when the attacks executed several curl commands to test internet connectivity, after which the Windows command-line tool netstat was executed to collect network configuration information. This was followed by setting up persistence on the host by means of a scheduled task.

The task was designed to execute a legitimate Microsoft binary "msbuild.exe" to run an unknown payload, as well as create another scheduled task that's configured to run every 60 minutes as a high-privileged SYSTEM user.

This new task, Symantec and Carbon Black said, was capable of loading and injecting unknown code into "csc.exe" that ultimately established communications with a command-and-control (C2) server ("38.180.83[.]166"). Subsequently, the attackers were observed executing a custom loader to unpack and run an unspecified payload, likely a remote access trojan (RAT) in memory.

Also observed was the execution of the legitimate Vipre AV component ("vetysafe.exe") to sideload a DLL loader ("sbamres.dll"). This component is also said to have been used for DLL side-loading in connection with Deed RAT (aka Snappybee) in prior activity attributed to Salt Typhoon (aka Earth Estries), and in attacks attributed to Earth Longzhi, a sub-cluster of APT41.

"A copy of this malicious DLL was previously used in attacks linked to the China-based threat actors known as Space Pirates," Broadcom said. "A variant of this component, with a different filename, was also used by that Chinese APT group Kelp (aka Salt Typhoon) in a separate incident."

Some of the other tools observed in the targeted network included Dcsync and Imjpuexc. It's not clear how successful the attackers were in their efforts. No additional activity was registered after April 16, 2025.

"It is clear from the activity on this victim that the attackers were aiming to establish a persistent and stealthy presence on the network, and they were also very interested in targeting domain controllers, which could potentially allow them to spread to many machines on the network," Symantec and Carbon Black said.

"The sharing of tools among groups has been a long-standing trend among Chinese threat actors, making it difficult to say which specific group is behind a set of activities."

The disclosure comes as a security researcher who goes by the online moniker BartBlaze disclosed Salt Typhoon's exploitation of a security flaw in WinRAR (CVE-2025-8088) to initiate an attack chain that sideloads a DLL responsible for running shellcode on the compromised host. The final payload is designed to establish contact with a remote server ("mimosa.gleeze[.]com").

BartBlaze told The Hacker News that the activity dates back to September 2025, shortly after the WinRAR vulnerability became public knowledge. The final payload is a backdoor that supports system fingerprinting, SOCKS tunneling over Winsock, HTTP/S over WinINet with GET/POST/PUT and HTTP CONNECT, modifying Firefox and Internet Explorer proxy setting, and hijacking default HTTP shell open command to a chosen executable.

Activity from Other Chinese Hacking Groups

According to a report from ESET, China-aligned groups have continued to remain active, striking entities across Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the U.S. to serve Beijing's geopolitical priorities. Some of the notable campaigns include -

  • The targeting of the energy sector in Central Asia by a threat actor codenamed Speccom (aka IndigoZebra or SMAC) in July 2025 via phishing emails to deliver a variant of BLOODALCHEMY and custom backdoors such as kidsRAT and RustVoralix.
  • The targeting of European organizations by a threat actor codenamed DigitalRecyclers in July 2025, using an unusual persistence technique that involved the use of the Magnifier accessibility tool to gain SYSTEM privileges.
  • The targeting of governmental entities in Latin America (Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama) between June and September 2025 by a threat actor codenamed FamousSparrow that likely exploited ProxyLogon flaws in Microsoft Exchange Server to deploy SparrowDoor.
  • The targeting of a Taiwanese company in the defense aviation sector, a U.S. trade organization based in China, and the China-based offices of a Greek governmental entity, and an Ecuadorian government body between May and September 2025 by a threat actor codenamed SinisterEye (aka LuoYu and Cascade Panda) to deliver malware like WinDealer (for Windows) and SpyDealer (for Android) using adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks to hijack legitimate software update mechanisms.
  • The targeting of a Japanese company and a multinational enterprise, both in Cambodia, in June 2025 by a threat actor codenamed PlushDaemon by means of AitM poisoning to deliver SlowStepper.

"PlushDaemon achieves AitM positioning by compromising network devices such as routers, and deploying a tool that we have named EdgeStepper, which redirects DNS traffic from the targeted network to a remote, attacker-controlled DNS server," ESET said.

"This server responds to queries for domains associated with software update infrastructure with the IP address of the web server that performs the update hijacking and ultimately serves PlushDaemon's flagship backdoor, SlowStepper."

Chinese Hacking Groups Target Misconfigured IIS Servers

In recent months, threat hunters have also spotted a Chinese-speaking threat actor targeting misconfigured IIS servers using publicly exposed machine keys to install a backdoor called TOLLBOOTH (aka HijackServer) that comes with SEO cloaking and web shell capabilities.

"REF3927 abuses publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys to compromise IIS servers and deploy TOLLBOOTH SEO cloaking modules globally," Elastic Security Labs researchers said in a report published late last month. Per HarfangLab, the operation has infected hundreds of servers around the world, with infections concentrated in India and the U.S.

The attacks are also characterized by attempts to weaponize the initial access to drop the Godzilla web shell, execute GotoHTTP remote access tool, use Mimikatz to harvest credentials, and deploy HIDDENDRIVER, a modified version of the open source rootkit Hidden, to conceal the presence of malicious payloads on the infected machine.

REF3927 attack pattern and TOLLBOOTH SEO cloaking workflow

It's worth pointing out that the cluster is the latest addition to a long list of Chinese threat actors, such as GhostRedirector, Operation Rewrite, and UAT-8099, that have targeted IIS servers, indicating a surge in such activity.

"While the malicious operators appear to be using Chinese as their main language and leveraging the compromises to support search engine optimization (SEO), we notice that the deployed module offers a persistent and unauthenticated channel which allows any party to remotely execute commands on affected servers," the French cybersecurity company said.

(The story was updated after publication to include a response from Symantec and Carbon Black.)

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2025/11/from-log4j-to-iis-chinas-hackers-turn.html