ActGuard: Pre-execution Action Auditing against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
ActGuard audits LLM agent actions before execution against predicted tool priors, masking only malicious spans from indirect prompt injections while preserving utility.
ActGuard is a pre-execution action auditing framework against indirect prompt injection in LLM agents, judging whether external content causes the current action to deviate from a locally reasonable expectation rather than whether content is inherently suspicious. At each step it predicts the tools likely used by the upcoming action, builds a local tool prior, then performs tool-level contrastive analysis and parameter-level evidence localization to identify deviations. A verifier masks only spans confirmed as malicious and regenerates the action from the sanitized context. On challenging tool-using agent benchmarks it reduces attack success to state-of-the-art levels while keeping task utility close to the no-attack setting; code is publicly available on GitHub.
- Audits actions pre-execution instead of over-sanitizing external content
- Builds local tool prior from predicted upcoming tool usage without constraining trajectory
- Tool-level contrastive analysis plus parameter-level evidence localization pinpoints malicious spans
- Matches SOTA attack success reduction while keeping utility near no-attack baseline
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgLarge language model (LLM) agents interact with external environments through tool invocation, but tool outputs can also expose them to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing defenses mainly rely on prompt hardening, content filtering, pre-generated plans, or permission constraints.
By Bingzheng Wang · arxiv.org
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