Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour

Two-way physical-layer authentication bounds multi-antenna impersonation

Original title: Maurer-Inspired Two-Way Physical-Layer Authentication Against Multi-Antenna Impersonation Attacks

arXiv cs.CRby Pin-Hsun Lin ()1 min read
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Derived missed-detection bounds cover challenge replacement, response replacement, and both under TDD reciprocity.

The paper studies Maurer-inspired two-way physical-layer authentication when a multi-antenna impersonator, Trudy, may replace Alice's challenge, Bob's response, or both. Bob adds artificial noise to the challenge and Alice adds spatial artificial noise while forwarding the mixture, so impersonation must match Bob's fresh randomness beyond public-pilot channel checks. For quasi-static Gaussian MIMO channels with TDD reciprocity, the authors derive missed-detection bounds that assume attack-free initial training and account for estimation error and noise leakage. With equal antenna counts, some scenarios show lower worst-case missed detection than specified one-way tests.

Key facts
  • Trudy may replace the challenge, the response, or both.
  • Bounds assume attack-free initial training and preparation.
  • Equal antenna numbers are used in the comparison scenarios.
  • The scheme is compared with one-way tests with and without artificial noise.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

In this work, we investigate Maurer-inspired two-way physical-layer authentication. Alice seeks authentication by Bob in the presence of a multi-antenna impersonator, Trudy. Trudy may replace the challenge to Alice, the response to Bob, or both.

arXiv cs.CR

By Pin-Hsun Lin · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.