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Microsoft Entra TrustSink Attack Uses Rogue MFA Provider to Steal Passwords

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read2 · 1 read
AI summary · grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Varonis disclosed TrustSink, a post-compromise Entra technique using a rogue MFA provider to steal passwords.

Varonis Threat Labs disclosed TrustSink, a post-compromise technique that abuses Microsoft Entra External Authentication Methods. An attacker who can change the Authentication Methods Policy registers a rogue OpenID Connect provider that shows a fake Microsoft password page during MFA and records the password, timestamp, and source IP. The provider returns a signed JWT, so Entra completes the login with no error. Varonis demonstrated it with a Python and FastAPI server; defenders must remove the provider before rotating credentials.

Key facts
  • Requires Global Administrator or Authentication Policy Administrator rights
  • Rogue external provider captures passwords during a normal Microsoft sign-in
  • A signed token lets login complete without an error
  • Password resets fail while the malicious provider remains registered
  • Monitor Entra logs for new external authentication methods
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From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

TrustSink, a post-compromise credential-phishing technique that abuses Microsoft Entra External Authentication Methods (EAMs) to place a rogue password prompt inside an otherwise legitimate Microsoft sign-in flow. The attack enables an adversary with elevated tenant privileges to capture plaintext passwords while returning a valid signed token to Entra, allowing the victim’s login to complete without an […]

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

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