Certifying Hidden Paths: Scalable Topology Assurance for QKD Networks
A zero-knowledge scheme lets QKD providers certify policy-compliant routes without revealing network topology.
Large QKD networks use trusted repeaters, so path policy must be assured without exposing operator topology. The paper certifies nodes and edges separately with multi-message signatures and zero-knowledge presentations that hide the chosen route up to a public length bound. For a preselected route, proof size and prove/verify work depend on route attributes rather than total network size. A BBS construction stays under 300 KiB at ell=m=n=50, with generation and verification under 400 ms at ell=64 and m=n=8.
- Certifies nodes and edges independently using multi-message signatures
- Proof size for a chosen route does not grow with network size
- Hides route length up to a public bound
- BBS presentations stay under 300 KiB at parameter 50
- Prove and verify times stay under 400 ms in the reported setting
Full article191 words · extracted from arxiv.org · click to collapse
Large-scale Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks rely on trusted repeaters, making the security properties of the selected communication path an essential part of end-to-end assurance. At the same time, network operators may be unwilling to disclose their internal topology. We present a topology-certification mechanism that lets a provider prove in zero knowledge that policy-compliant routes between two endpoints exist, without disclosing the routes in an individual presentation. Our main idea is to certify nodes and edges independently using multi-message signatures, rather than signing the complete graph as one object. For a route chosen in advance, proof size and cryptographic proving and verification work depend on its positions and attributes, independently of the overall network size, whereas route discovery and certification have separate graph-dependent costs. The construction hides the actual route length up to a public bound and sketches extensions to node-disjoint routes and monotonic additions within a graph epoch. We give a formal security model and conditional proofs of unforgeability and graph hiding for a generic construction. For a BBS-based construction, presentation-size estimates remain below $300$\,KiB at $\ell=m=n=50$, and measured generation and verification times remain below $400$\,ms at $\ell=64$ and $m=n=8$.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11513