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Iran-linked COBALT MIRAGE group uses ransomware in its operations

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2018-13379
Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN

CVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN web portal that allows an unauthenticated attacker to download FortiOS system files via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. By traversing directories through crafted requests to the exposed web portal, the attacker can retrieve sensitive files, a technique publicly documented as yielding the SSL VPN session file containing usernames and passwords in plaintext. Any organization running the SSL VPN web portal on a FortiGate appliance is affected, and risk is highest where the portal is directly reachable from the internet. The flaw is confirmed in the wild: it was added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. No public PoC is listed in the provided data, but credential theft tied to this bug has been widely reused by threat actors.

Do: Apply the patched FortiOS release per Fortinet's vendor advisory immediately, as this is a CISA KEV required action; if the fixed version is not known from this data, follow Fortinet's FG-IR-18-384 advisory for the correct upgrade path. Rotate SSL VPN credentials and review VPN access logs for path-traversal requests, since successful exploitation exposes plaintext session credentials, and restrict SSL VPN portal exposure to trusted sources where possible.

9.8100% KEV ransomware
  • Fortinet FortiOS
mass≈500,000 internet-exposed FortiOS SSL VPN portals (Fortinet cited ~480,000 affected devices)
CVE-2019-5591
Default-Configuration LDAP Impersonation in Fortinet FortiOS

CVE-2019-5591 is a default-configuration flaw in Fortinet FortiOS (CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical function): when a FortiGate acts as an LDAP client over SSL/TLS for authentication purposes, the default configuration does not properly authenticate the LDAP server, allowing an unauthenticated attacker on the same subnet to impersonate the LDAP server. The attack requires adjacency (the attacker must be on the same network segment as the device's LDAP traffic) and only works where the device uses LDAP over TLS with the default, non-validating settings. A successful attacker can intercept sensitive authentication information, such as usernames and passwords, exchanged with the LDAP server, with high confidentiality impact but no integrity or availability impact per the CVSS score. Organizations running affected FortiOS releases with LDAP-over-TLS configured are exposed; FortiOS runs on one of the largest firewall/VPN installed bases, though the source data does not state exact affected version ranges or deployment counts. The flaw is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03) with known in-the-wild and ransomware use; late-2021 CISA and FBI advisories warned that APT actors were exploiting Fortinet bugs, including this one, for initial access, and no public PoC is known.

Do: Upgrade affected FortiGate/FortiOS units to a fixed release (6.2.1+, 6.0.8+, 5.6.10+, or 5.4.12+) per Fortinet's instructions, as required by CISA's KEV listing. If patching is delayed, disable the use of SSL/TLS in the LDAP server configuration or restrict and monitor the network path between the FortiGate and the LDAP server. Inventory which devices use LDAPS for authentication and review authentication logs for signs of server impersonation or credential theft.

6.518% KEV ransomware
  • Fortinet FortiOS FortiOS 6.2.0; 6.0.0-6.0.7; 5.6.0-5.6.9; 5.4.0-5.4.11 (fixed in 6.2.1, 6.0.8, 5.6.10 and 5.4.12, per the Fortinet PSIRT advisory; CISA data confirms FortiOS as
largetens of thousands of FortiGate deployments plausibly affected (a subset of a very large FortiOS installed base that connects to LDAP over TLS)
CVE-2020-12812
MFA Bypass via Username Case Change in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN

Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN improperly validates the second factor of authentication (FortiToken), allowing a user with valid primary credentials to log in without being prompted for their one-time token. The bypass is triggered by changing the letter case of the username (e.g., typing 'Admin' instead of 'admin'), a case-sensitivity handling flaw (CWE-178) in the authentication logic (CWE-287). An attacker who has stolen, phished, or reused a user's primary credentials can therefore gain full SSL VPN access without the multi-factor protection defenders assume is enforced. Any organization running an affected FortiOS SSL VPN portal with FortiToken two-factor authentication for users is exposed. The flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 49.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days (99th percentile); no public PoC is known.

Do: Apply the FortiOS update per Fortinet's advisory, as required by CISA's KEV listing. Until patched, audit SSL VPN logs for successful logins in which no FortiToken second-factor prompt occurred (especially sessions authenticating with altered username case), and consider restricting the SSL VPN portal to trusted source addresses or disabling it temporarily. Any accounts found with second-factor-free VPN logins should have credentials rotated and be checked for follow-on compromise, given known ransomware use.

9.849% KEV ransomware
  • Fortinet FortiOS
masson the order of hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed FortiOS SSL VPN portals (public scans in 2020-2021 counted roughly 150,000-500,000)
CVE-2021-31207
Security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell) enables webshell RCE

CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server, classified as an unrestricted file-write issue (CWE-434) that lets an attacker bypass intended restrictions and write files of their choosing to the server. It is the final bug in the ProxyShell chain: chained with the autodiscover SSRF and PowerShell backend elevation flaws, it allows an unauthenticated attacker to reach the Exchange PowerShell API, write arbitrary files such as an ASPX webshell, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. A successful attacker gains full control of the on-premises Exchange server, including mailbox access, stolen credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement; the bug has been used to deploy ransomware and keyloggers. On-premises deployments of Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per vendor advisories) are affected, while Exchange Online/cloud mailboxes are not. Exploitation is essentially certain and ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, public ProxyShell PoC/exploit code is available, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%.

Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 security updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (or any later security/cumulative update) per vendor instructions, and restrict untrusted access to Exchange's autodiscover and PowerShell endpoints. Hunt for ASPX webshells under the Exchange FrontEnd directories and review IIS logs for autodiscover.json requests chaining PowerShell, since many servers were compromised before patching. Given known ransomware use and KEV listing, treat any server that was unpatched or internet-exposed during the exploitation window as potentially compromised.

6.6100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (per vendor advisory; CISA lists 'Microsoft Exchange Server' generically)
massHundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (public scans around the July 2021 ProxyShell disclosure showed roughly 400,000-600,000 internet-exposed…
CVE-2021-34473
+1 in the same advisory: …34523
SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell)

Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).

Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity.

9.1
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Exchange Server deployments not yet patched with Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) security updates; the source data does not enumerate specific vers
masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,…
Full article403 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse

Iranian group used Bitlocker and DiskCryptor in a series of attacks targeting organizations in Israel, the US, Europe, and Australia.

Researchers at Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) are investigating a series of attacks conducted by the Iran-linked COBALT MIRAGE APT group. The threat actors have been active since at least June 2020 and are linked to the Iranian COBALT ILLUSION group (aka APT35, Charming Kitten, PHOSPHOROUS and TunnelVision).

The researchers identified two distinct clusters of intrusions (labeled as Cluster A and Cluster B) associated with COBALT MIRAGE.

In Cluster A, the APT group use BitLocker and DiskCryptor to conduct financially motivated opportunistic ransomware attacks. Cluster B focuses on targeted attacks for intelligence purposes, but experts observed some attacks deploying ransomware.

Most of the victims are in Israel, the U.S., Europe, and Australia. The threat actors obtain initial access by scanning servers exposed online and exploiting known vulnerabilities such as Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591. Starting from late September 2021, the group was observed targeting Microsoft Exchange servers by exploiting the ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) to deploy Fast Reverse Proxy client (FRPC) and gain remote access to the systems.

The researchers have also observed COBALT MIRAGE using at the end of December an unfinished attempt at ransomware, while their infrastructure was hosting files related to to the HiddenTear open-source ransomware project, the latter has yet to be used by the group in attacks in the wild.

“The January and March incidents typify the different styles of attacks conducted by COBALT MIRAGE. While the threat actors appear to have had a reasonable level of success gaining initial access to a wide range of targets, their ability to capitalize on that access for financial gain or intelligence collection appears limited.” concludes the report. “At a minimum, COBALT MIRAGE’s ability to use publicly available encryption tools for ransomware operations and mass scan-and-exploit activity to compromise organizations creates an ongoing threat.”

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, COBALT MIRAGE)

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/131218/apt/iran-cobalt-mirage-ransomware-attacks.html