Hackers Pose as Domain Controllers to Steal Active Directory Password Hashes
Attackers abuse Active Directory replication (DCSync) via the DRSUAPI protocol to steal password hashes and forge Golden Tickets for persistent domain compromise.
Security reporting citing Trellix details how threat actors impersonate domain controllers to request replication data and obtain NTLM password hashes without dumping LSASS on the domain controller. With Domain Admin or replication rights, attackers can steal the KRBTGT hash and forge long-lived Golden Tickets that survive password resets. Defenders should monitor DRSUAPI requests from non-DC systems, restrict replication permissions, and enforce MFA and tiered administrative access.
- DCSync abuses legitimate AD replication (DRSUAPI) to dump NTLM hashes remotely
- KRBTGT hash theft enables Golden Ticket forging and long-term persistence
- Avoids LSASS dumping, making malicious traffic resemble normal replication
- Mitigations: restrict replication rights, MFA, tiered admin, non-DC replication alerts
- Products
- Active Directory
- Organizations
- Trellix
From the original article
2 min read at cybersecuritynews.com
Threat actors are increasingly abusing Active Directory replication to impersonate domain controllers and steal password hashes from enterprise networks. This technique, known as a DCSync attack, can let attackers obtain credential data for privileged accounts without deploying malware directly on a legitimate domain controller.
By Abinaya · cybersecuritynews.com
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