Hackers Steal Active Directory Password Hashes Without Attacking Domain Controllers Directly
Attackers use the DCSync technique to impersonate domain controllers and harvest AD password hashes and Kerberos keys without directly compromising domain controllers, Trellix warns.
Per Trellix, threat actors increasingly abuse Active Directory replication via DCSync, using privileged credentials to invoke DRSGetNCChanges and retrieve NTLM password hashes and Kerberos key material without running code on domain controllers. Capturing the krbtgt account hash enables forging Golden Tickets for persistent, highly privileged domain access. Because malicious replication traffic mimics legitimate DRS/RPC activity, defenders should monitor Windows Security Event ID 4662, restrict replication permissions, and investigate replication requests from non-domain-controller systems.
- DCSync needs replication-privileged credentials, not code execution on domain controllers.
- Attackers invoke DRSGetNCChanges to harvest NTLM hashes and Kerberos key material.
- Compromising krbtgt enables Golden Tickets for persistent privileged domain access.
- Detection: Event ID 4662, DRS/RPC telemetry, and non-DC hosts issuing replication requests.
- Limit and audit directory replication rights, especially delegated service accounts.
- Vendors
- Trellix
From the original article
2 min read at gbhackers.com
Threat actors are increasingly exploiting Active Directory replication mechanisms to steal password hashes without directly compromising a domain controller. This technique, known as DCSync, allows attackers with privileged domain credentials to impersonate a legitimate domain controller and request sensitive directory replication data.
By Divya · gbhackers.com
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