Classical clients can privately use one untrusted quantum server
Original title: The Entire Quantum Computer on a Classical Leash
Assuming post-quantum LWE hardness, the protocol also yields classical verification of quantum sampling and remote state preparation.
A paper shows a classical client with no quantum hardware can treat a single untrusted, potentially malicious quantum server as its own quantum computer. The client can privately choose and run computations, prepare and process states, and store quantum memory on the server that persists across rounds. The construction is a maliciously secure two-party computation protocol between a classical client and a quantum server, assuming only the post-quantum hardness of learning with errors. The authors say this resolves classical verification of quantum sampling with negligible computational soundness error and remote preparation of arbitrary efficiently preparable states.
Unconfirmed: Results are theoretical; the paper does not report an implementation or concrete parameters.
- Only one untrusted quantum server is required.
- Quantum memory on the server stays hidden from the server.
- The client can act as a quantum party in interactive protocols.
- Security rests solely on post-quantum hardness of learning with errors.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgWe show that a classical client with no quantum hardware can use a single untrusted and potentially malicious quantum server as if it were its own trusted quantum computer. Through the server, the client can privately choose and run quantum computations, prepare quantum states, and process quantum states supplied by other parties.
By Yael Tauman Kalai · arxiv.org
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