OT systems remain connected to networks
Original title: Let’s Talk About Why all This OT Stuff is Connected
OT and ICS systems exposed through IT/OT convergence, DMZ use and remote connectivity since the early 2000s.
IT/OT convergence began 15-20 years ago with Windows HMI and Ethernet encapsulating serial traffic for cheaper support. Subsequent homogenisation of deployments across Purdue Model levels enabled scalable attacks. Remote connectivity via DMZ at Level 3.5 and SCADA networks for regional control followed. Renewables and smart meters increased monitoring needs, further exposing systems to hackers.
- Serial protocols replaced by Ethernet
- Uniform deployments across vendors
- DMZ at Purdue Level 3.5 common
- Remote bidirectional SCADA control adopted
- Loss of security by obscurity increased
From the original article
10 min read at tisiphone.net
It’s been a really bad month (and year) for OT cybersecurity. From a wave of new, high-impact vulnerabilities, to attacks on supermarket refrigerators , to attacks on blood banks , we’ve been left shorthanded and reeling. And that’s on top of months of attacks against water utilities .
By tisiphone.net via polywolf · tisiphone.net
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