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Per-action checks miss relational policy violations in LLM agents

Original title: Local Allow, Global Deny: Why Per-Action Authorization Does Not Compose in LLM Agents

arXiv cs.CRby Anmol Pandey ()1 min read1 · 1 read
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

A SAT/SMT synthesizer produces witnesses that per-action monitors approve but paired-execution review flags.

Researchers argue that screening each LLM tool call alone does not enforce policies spanning intent, purpose, provenance, consent and delegation. Relational purpose violations are a 2-safety property with no single-trace point of blame, so a no-false-alarm per-action monitor detects none of them. AL-SYNTH, which uses no language model, emits minimal witnesses; nine LLM judges almost always approved them one at a time but flagged them together. None of six surveyed guardrails compares executions.

Key facts
  • Each synthesized witness is checked against an exhaustive oracle.
  • Per-action blocking of witnesses matched a benign control.
  • The impossibility result does not depend on the model.
  • Monitors must compare executions or accept false alarms.
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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Autonomous LLM agents act through tools under per-action authorization: a local guard screens each tool call in isolation. We show that local authorization does not compose into global authorization. A compositional authorization failure (CAF) is a locally authorized execution, or a pair of locally authorized executions, that violates a global policy spanning intent, purpose, provenance, consent, and delegation.

arXiv cs.CR

By Anmol Pandey · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

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