EX-ARRR: Sailing the 0-click Seas
Researcher reports a zero-click heap overflow in Apple's OpenEXR decoder, triggered when iMessage parses an image.
A researcher published a write-up of a zero-click heap overflow in Apple's OpenEXR decoder, libAppleEXR, which ImageIO uses to parse EXR images. The destination buffer is sized for RGB while the interleave path writes an extra alpha channel, so mostly attacker-controlled pixel data spills into adjacent heap memory. The author says an iMessage carrying the image is decoded immediately by a privileged daemon, with no tap, and that they reproduced the overflow on a real iPad. The excerpt does not name a CVE, affected versions, or a patch.
- Heap overflow: EXR writer emits four channels into a three-channel allocation.
- Author says iMessage parses the image with zero taps, before BlastDoor.
- Controlled overflow was demonstrated on a physical iPad.
- Bug was found with LLM-guided fuzzing of libAppleEXR.
- Excerpt names no CVE and no patch.
From the original article
15 min read at ironpeak.beEvery serious Apple device compromise of the last decade has boring person at the bottom of it: a parser read a file and trusted it a little too much. Not a phishing link, nor a stolen password, but a daemon you never launched, decoding a file you never opened, one byte past the end of a buffer. This is that story.
By ironpeak.be via fro · ironpeak.be
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.