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rsyslog imdtls permitted-peer authorization bypass

oss-security ()2
AI summary · grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

rsyslog's imdtls module keeps DTLS sessions active when permitted-peer checks fail after a successful handshake.

Rainer Gerhards reported that rsyslog's optional imdtls input module does not enforce tls.permittedpeer after a CA-authenticated DTLS handshake when tls.authmode is "name" or "fingerprint". After SSL_accept() succeeds, a failed permitted-peer identity check only logs a warning and leaves the DTLS session active, so records continue to be read and received. The disclosure cites no CVE and does not say the flaw is being exploited.

Key facts
  • Optional imdtls fails to enforce tls.permittedpeer after a successful DTLS handshake.
  • Affects tls.authmode set to name or fingerprint.
  • A failed identity check logs a warning but leaves the session active.
  • The report names no CVE and does not claim exploitation.
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From the original article

Posted by Rainer Gerhards on Sep 22 Hello, The optional rsyslog imdtls input module did not enforce tls. permittedpeer after a successful CA-authenticated DTLS handshake when configured with tls. authmode="name" or tls.

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