Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
Cryptographers propose Sequential Revelation Auctions that limit abort leakage with a small MPC gadget and finite penalties.
The paper studies credible auctions when the auctioneer can control shill bidders and abort an MPC protocol after learning the outcome. It proposes the MPC Decomposition Principle: a small gadget reveals only the winner's identity, not payments, so an abort leaks bounded information. Combined with sequential revelation and finite penalties, the Sequential Revelation Auction is credible when the penalty is at least the sum of per-bidder revenues, and that bound is tight for equal-revenue distributions. Using constant-round MPC, the construction gives a constant-round, incentive-compatible, revenue-optimal credible auction for product distributions with vanishing revenue tails.
- Monolithic MPC lets an auctioneer abort after seeing an unsatisfactory revenue outcome.
- A minimal gadget reveals the winner identity but no payment information.
- A penalty at least the sum of per-bidder revenues is sufficient and tight.
- Constant-round SRA resolves an open question for product distributions with vanishing tails.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe design of credible auctions---mechanisms where a revenue-maximizing auctioneer has no incentive to deviate from the protocol---faces a fundamental cryptographic barrier when the auctioneer controls shill bidders.
By Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira · arxiv.org
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