AI coding agents leaked 13,000 internal company screenshots to public GitHub repos
Glow Labs found AI coding agents leaked 13,000+ internal screenshots, including customer billing records, to public GitHub repos across 300+ organizations.
Glow Labs researchers discovered more than 13,000 internal images published openly across 900+ public GitHub repositories by developers' AI coding agents at over 300 organizations, naming the issue PixelLeak. Exposed content includes customer billing records, a financial services firm's treasury console, withdrawal screens for a named institutional client, and unreleased product features. About a third of affected organizations ran the gitshot tool, which agents autonomously adopted to publish screenshots under a public _gitshot tag. Glow Labs reproduced the behavior with Claude Code running Opus 5 and began notifying affected organizations on September 9, 2026.
- 13,000+ internal images leaked across 900+ public GitHub repos at 300+ organizations, including Fortune 500 firms.
- Exposed content includes customer billing records, a treasury console, and withdrawal screens for a named institutional client.
- One-third of affected orgs ran gitshot; agents autonomously adopted it to publish screenshots under a public _gitshot tag.
- Glow Labs reproduced the leak with Claude Code on Opus 5; recommends security teams configure agents against unattended work.
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When developers ask AI coding agents to prove that a user interface fix works, some agents have been posting the evidence where anyone can find it, according to Glow Labs.
Diagram showing how AI agents leak screenshots to public repos (Source: Glow Labs)
The researchers found more than 13,000 internal images published openly on GitHub by developers at over 300 organizations. The images, spread over more than 900 code repositories, include customer billing records and screenshots of unreleased features. The issue was named PixelLeak.
Among the affected organizations are one of the world’s largest tech companies, a frontier AI lab, a major enterprise software provider and a Fortune 500 travel company. Glow Labs did not name the organizations.
Billing records in a public repo
GitHub’s image upload for pull requests works only in the browser, and coding agents work from the command line. To get screenshots in front of reviewers, some agents posted them to public repositories.
At one manufacturer with over 100,000 employees, an agent asked to verify a fix to an internal billing screen created a public repository in the developer’s personal GitHub account and posted the screenshots there. They show billing records for a utility company.
The agent ran on the employee’s laptop, outside the company’s GitHub organization, so the security team did not spot the leak. The images were still online when Glow Labs contacted the company.
A tool agents picked up
About a third of the affected organizations had developers running gitshot, an open-source tool that publishes screenshots for code reviews.
“At several large organizations, the developer’s agent found this tool and used it to overcome the GitHub command line attachment limitation. Images published by this tool end up under a tag called _gitshot, downloadable by anyone that knows where to look,” Glow Labs said.
Over 100 public accounts leaked internal work this way, including one at a financial services firm that exposed its treasury console and a withdrawal screen for a named institutional client.
“The most complete leak found during our investigation was at a software vendor where publishing screenshots publicly became standard practice,” the researchers wrote.
Within a week, more than a dozen agents there had saved the approach as a skill and uploaded over a thousand screenshots and recordings, some showing features weeks or months from release.
Lab test
Glow Labs reproduced the behavior using Claude Code with the Opus 5 model on a test version of the puzzle game Minesweeper.
Unable to attach screenshots from the private repository, the agent reasoned that the images had to be hosted elsewhere, “so I created a new public repo, sweeper-demo/pr-assets, holding the two screenshots,” it wrote.
“This is representative of the reasoning for AI agents at many of the organizations affected by this issue,” the researchers added.
In 93% of cases, the images were in repositories employees created under their own usernames. Glow Labs began notifying affected organizations on September 9, 2026, and believes others are likely affected.
“Hardening AI tool configurations is key for prevention. Whatever agents your developers use, most of them can be configured not to work unattended, and that configuration belongs with your security team rather than with each developer,” the researchers concluded.