Kaspersky outlines a trust-boundary method for cloud pentests
Original title: Transcending the trust boundaries: how a cloud pentest works
The firm treats crossing tenant, overlay, and underlay boundaries as the goal, not merely finding bugs or running code.
Kaspersky Securelist described its cloud penetration-testing approach, developed over several years and dozens of projects. It frames infrastructure as external, overlay, and underlay zones and says protection depends on whether trust boundaries between them hold. Assessments ask whether an attacker can reach other tenants’ data, a provider IAM account, internal resources, or escape a virtual environment. A failed crossing is called useful but not proof that no other path exists.
- Most historical cloud pentests focused on consoles, interfaces, APIs, and the perimeter.
- Remote code execution in an isolated tenant container is treated as a starting point.
- Cross-tenant impact means affecting another tenant without an architectural trust relationship.
- The authors say there is no single standard for cloud pentests.
- Organizations
- Kaspersky
From the original article
14 min read at securelist.com
This is the first article in a series on cloud penetration testing. We'll cover the three cloud layers (External, Overlay, and Underlay), common architectures (OpenStack and Kubernetes), typical attack chains, and real-world incidents.
By Matvey Bukhtoyarov, Denis Stepanov, Kaspersky Security Services · securelist.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.