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Speech-token inversion clones a voice from a short leaked representation

Original title: From Speech Tokens to Stolen Voices: Attacker-Chosen-Text Speaker Impersonation via Representation Inversion

arXiv cs.CRby Ye Lu ()1 min read1
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

A three-second Moshi leak produced 0.78 average speaker similarity and a 3.80% target-text word error rate.

Researchers describe STIA, a speech-token inversion attack that turns a single short leaked speech representation into attacker-chosen speech in the victim’s voice. The original audio and its transcript are not required. A conditional flow-matching model is trained on public same-speaker utterance pairs and accepts discrete, continuous, or mixed representations. On a Moshi representation corresponding to three seconds of speech, they report average CAM++ speaker cosine similarity of 0.78 and target-text word error rate of 3.80%.

Unconfirmed: Results are laboratory measurements on public data, not confirmed abuse of a deployed system.

Key facts
  • The speech frontend may stay on the device while representations go to a server.
  • Training uses different utterances from the same speaker in public datasets.
  • The reported Moshi case uses a representation of three seconds of speech.
  • Reported scores are 0.78 CAM++ cosine similarity and 3.80% word error rate.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Reusable speaker identity from leaked speech representations

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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Speech interaction systems have gradually evolved from traditional cascaded systems that use text as intermediate information to end-to-end speech language models that directly process speech representations. In some applications, the speech frontend runs on the user's device and sends speech representations to a remote server for inference, while the original audio remains local.

arXiv cs.CR

By Ye Lu · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.