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China-nexus UAT-11587 targets government and policy organizations across Asia with Antino backdoor

Cisco Talosby Ashley Shen ()11 min read2 · 1 read
AI summary · glm-5.3Summaries by Vani AI

Cisco Talos attributes China-nexus UAT-11587 to espionage against Asian governments using the Rust-based Antino backdoor, with ~350 compromised endpoints in eight countries.

Cisco Talos tracks UAT-11587, a China-nexus espionage actor first observed in September 2025, targeting government and policy organizations across Asia including Taiwan, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia. The actor delivers a previously undocumented Rust-compiled Windows backdoor called Antino, which supports host reconnaissance, shell and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading, and persistence. Antino's C2 operates exclusively through Microsoft Graph, using Outlook and OneDrive objects as dead drops instead of a dedicated command server. By July 2026, Talos identified at least 16 affected or targeted institutional environments across eight countries, totaling approximately 350 compromised endpoints, with delivery via spear-phishing, tailored decoy documents, a five-stage infection chain, and heavy Cloudflare infrastructure use. Talos found partial overlap with Symantec's Jewelbug reporting but tracks UAT-11587 as a separate cluster.

Key facts
  • Antino backdoor is Rust-compiled with C2 exclusively via Microsoft Graph Outlook/OneDrive dead drops
  • Attribution to China based on zh-CN metadata, UTC+8 timestamps, and rsproxy.cn build artifacts
  • Spear-phishing with decoy documents led victims through a five-stage infection chain
  • At least 16 institutional environments and ~350 endpoints compromised across eight Asian countries
  • Possible low-confidence overlap with Symantec's Jewelbug and UNC6384 delivery infrastructure
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Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domaind2nq35tel3ucuo.cloudfront.netter hexadecimal identifier>[.]r2[.]dev” Amazon CloudFront: “d2nq35tel3ucuo[.]cloudfront[.]net” The fixed Cloudflare Pages hostname “oisadjfoinsiduhfn
domaind32tpl7xt7175h.cloudfront.netcript downloader associated with UAT-11587 that referenced “d32tpl7xt7175h[.]cloudfront[.]net”, the same CloudFront distribution previously reported
domainoisadjfoinsiduhfnoisdnfosdnoifnsoid.pages.devuo[.]cloudfront[.]net” The fixed Cloudflare Pages hostname “oisadjfoinsiduhfnoisdnfosdnoifnsoid[.]pages[.]dev” appears across multiple reviewed HTA variants. A hidde
domainosc-cdn.comges were sent through Migadu using the attacker-controlled “osc-cdn[.]com” domain as the RFC5321 envelope sender, while the RFC5322
domainpage.devection chain. Stage 1: HTA and WSF Stager The “my-<project>.page[.]dev” Cloudflare URL in the spear-phishing emails leads to the
domainpub-abfa7742e315485a98a5fafd6dbfb68e.r2.devsigned binary) Legitimate signed binary that loads slc.dll pub-abfa7742e315485a98a5fafd6dbfb68e.r2.dev/HeiqAW6Zslc.dll.pzs slc.dll (Antino C2 implant) Antino back
domainr2.devCloudflare R2: “pub-<32-character hexadecimal identifier>[.]r2[.]dev” Amazon CloudFront: “d2nq35tel3ucuo[.]cloudfront[.]net” T

From the original article

11 min read at blog.talosintelligence.com

Cisco Talos uncovered a cluster of activity we track as UAT-11587 targeting government and policy organizations across Asia, including in Taiwan, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia, to deliver a previously undocumented backdoor referred to as “Antino” in developer artifacts.

Cisco Talos

By Ashley Shen · blog.talosintelligence.com

Read the full article at Cisco Talos

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.