China-nexus UAT-11587 targets government and policy organizations across Asia with Antino backdoor
Cisco Talos attributes China-nexus UAT-11587 to espionage against Asian governments using the Rust-based Antino backdoor, with ~350 compromised endpoints in eight countries.
Cisco Talos tracks UAT-11587, a China-nexus espionage actor first observed in September 2025, targeting government and policy organizations across Asia including Taiwan, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia. The actor delivers a previously undocumented Rust-compiled Windows backdoor called Antino, which supports host reconnaissance, shell and PowerShell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading, and persistence. Antino's C2 operates exclusively through Microsoft Graph, using Outlook and OneDrive objects as dead drops instead of a dedicated command server. By July 2026, Talos identified at least 16 affected or targeted institutional environments across eight countries, totaling approximately 350 compromised endpoints, with delivery via spear-phishing, tailored decoy documents, a five-stage infection chain, and heavy Cloudflare infrastructure use. Talos found partial overlap with Symantec's Jewelbug reporting but tracks UAT-11587 as a separate cluster.
- Antino backdoor is Rust-compiled with C2 exclusively via Microsoft Graph Outlook/OneDrive dead drops
- Attribution to China based on zh-CN metadata, UTC+8 timestamps, and rsproxy.cn build artifacts
- Spear-phishing with decoy documents led victims through a five-stage infection chain
- At least 16 institutional environments and ~350 endpoints compromised across eight Asian countries
- Possible low-confidence overlap with Symantec's Jewelbug and UNC6384 delivery infrastructure
- ATT&CK
- T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentT1059.001 PowerShellT1059.003 Windows Command ShellT1055 Process InjectionT1102.003 Web Service
- Threat actors
- UAT-11587
- Organizations
- Cisco TalosAntinoSymantecJewelbugMicrosoft 365
Indicators of compromise
auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| domain | d2nq35tel3ucuo.cloudfront.net | ter hexadecimal identifier>[.]r2[.]dev” Amazon CloudFront: “d2nq35tel3ucuo[.]cloudfront[.]net” The fixed Cloudflare Pages hostname “oisadjfoinsiduhfn |
| domain | d32tpl7xt7175h.cloudfront.net | cript downloader associated with UAT-11587 that referenced “d32tpl7xt7175h[.]cloudfront[.]net”, the same CloudFront distribution previously reported |
| domain | oisadjfoinsiduhfnoisdnfosdnoifnsoid.pages.dev | uo[.]cloudfront[.]net” The fixed Cloudflare Pages hostname “oisadjfoinsiduhfnoisdnfosdnoifnsoid[.]pages[.]dev” appears across multiple reviewed HTA variants. A hidde |
| domain | osc-cdn.com | ges were sent through Migadu using the attacker-controlled “osc-cdn[.]com” domain as the RFC5321 envelope sender, while the RFC5322 |
| domain | page.dev | ection chain. Stage 1: HTA and WSF Stager The “my-<project>.page[.]dev” Cloudflare URL in the spear-phishing emails leads to the |
| domain | pub-abfa7742e315485a98a5fafd6dbfb68e.r2.dev | signed binary) Legitimate signed binary that loads slc.dll pub-abfa7742e315485a98a5fafd6dbfb68e.r2.dev/HeiqAW6Zslc.dll.pzs slc.dll (Antino C2 implant) Antino back |
| domain | r2.dev | Cloudflare R2: “pub-<32-character hexadecimal identifier>[.]r2[.]dev” Amazon CloudFront: “d2nq35tel3ucuo[.]cloudfront[.]net” T |
From the original article
11 min read at blog.talosintelligence.com
Cisco Talos uncovered a cluster of activity we track as UAT-11587 targeting government and policy organizations across Asia, including in Taiwan, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia, to deliver a previously undocumented backdoor referred to as “Antino” in developer artifacts.
By Ashley Shen · blog.talosintelligence.com
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.