Spyware isn’t going anywhere, and neither are its tactics
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-21893 | SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons SAML Component CVE-2024-21893 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure), Ivanti Policy Secure, and Ivanti Neurons. A remote attacker can trigger the flaw with crafted unauthenticated requests to the SAML component, causing the appliance to make requests to otherwise restricted resources. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to access certain restricted resources without any credentials, and CISA notes the flaw has been used in ransomware operations. Any organization running an affected Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, or Neurons deployment is exposed, particularly where the appliance is reachable from the internet. The vulnerability is confirmed exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-31, carries an EPSS probability of 100%, and no public proof-of-concept is known. Do: Apply Ivanti's released patches or the vendor-issued mitigations immediately per vendor instructions, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable, as required by CISA. Because ransomware use is documented, review SAML-related logs and appliance audit trails for signs of exploitation and follow-on compromise, and check for indicators of post-exploitation activity. Monitor Ivanti advisories for patched version numbers and updated mitigation guidance, since specific fixed versions are not yet specified in the available data. | 8.2 | 100% | KEV ransomware |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed appliances (with total user counts likely in the hundreds of thousands) | |
| CVE-2024-23222 | Apple WebKit Type Confusion Enables Arbitrary Code Execution Across iOS, macOS, tvOS CVE-2024-23222 is a type confusion flaw (CWE-843) in Apple's WebKit engine that allows arbitrary code execution when a device processes maliciously crafted web content, for example when a user is lured into loading attacker-controlled web pages in Safari or another WebKit-based view (the CVSS vector confirms user interaction is required). It affects a broad slice of the Apple ecosystem: Safari, iPhone OS/iPadOS on the iOS 15, 16 and 17 branches, macOS Monterey/Ventura/Sonoma, tvOS and visionOS, prior to the January 22, 2024 fixes. A successful attacker gains code execution on the target device with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability (CVSS 3.1: 8.8). The flaw was fixed in Safari 17.3, iOS/iPadOS 17.3, and backported to iOS/iPadOS 15.8.7 and 16.7.5 for devices that cannot upgrade to iOS 17, plus macOS Monterey 12.7.3, Ventura 13.6.4, Sonoma 14.3, tvOS 17.3 and visionOS 1.0.2. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the vulnerability was added to CISA KEV on 2024-01-23, one day after the fixes shipped, and is associated with the Coruna exploit kit, which reportedly chains multiple exploits to target iOS devices including older versions. Do: Update all affected devices to Safari 17.3, iOS/iPadOS 17.3 (or the iOS/iPadOS 15.8.7 and 16.7.5 backports for devices that cannot run 17), macOS Monterey 12.7.3, macOS Ventura 13.6.4, macOS Sonoma 14.3, tvOS 17.3 and visionOS 1.0.2. Prioritize endpoints used for web browsing and mobile users, since exploitation only requires a user to process crafted web content. The CISA KEV listing (added 2024-01-23) makes applying these vendor updates mandatory under the KEV required action, so verify fleet versions and confirm no devices remain on pre-patch builds. | 8.8 | 11% | KEV |
| massover 1 billion active Apple devices (effectively Apple's entire unpatched iPhone/iPad/Mac/Apple TV fleet) |
Indicators of compromiseauto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll →
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| md5 | 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194 | b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e MD5: 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194 Typical Filename: tmp000c3787 Claimed Product: Ultra Virus |
| md5 | 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731 | 77c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7 MD5: 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731 Typical Filename: aact.exe Claimed Product: AAct x86 Detect |
| md5 | 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551 | 7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf MD5: 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551 Typical Filename: rcx4d83.tmp Claimed Product: N/A Detectio |
| md5 | 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c | 81591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934 MD5: 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c Typical Filename: Wextract Claimed Product: Internet Explor |
| md5 | ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e | a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440 MD5: ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e Typical Filename: iizbpyilb.bat Claimed Product: N/A Detect |
| sha256 | 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440 | ternet Explorer Detection Name: W32.File.MalParent SHA 256: 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440 MD5: ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e Typical Filename: iiz |
| sha256 | 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf | ware files from Talos telemetry over the past week SHA 256: 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf MD5: 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551 Typical Filename: rcx |
| sha256 | 77c2372364b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e | 6 Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::in03.talos SHA 256: 77c2372364b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e MD5: 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194 Typical Filename: tmp |
| sha256 | 8664e2f59077c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7 | med Product: N/A Detection Name: Trojan.Agent.DDOH SHA 256: 8664e2f59077c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7 MD5: 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731 Typical Filename: aac |
| sha256 | e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934 | oduct: N/A Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Pykspa::tpd SHA 256: e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934 MD5: 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c Typical Filename: Wex |
Full article1,387 words · extracted from blog.talosintelligence.com · click to collapse
Thursday, February 8, 2024 14:00
Private and public efforts to curb the use of spyware and activity of other “mercenary” groups have heated up over the past week, with the U.S. government taking additional action against spyware users and some of the world’s largest tech companies calling out international governments to do more.
The illegal use of spyware to target high-profile or at-risk individuals is a global problem, as highlighted by this article from The Register that Talos’ Nick Biasini just contributed to. This software can often track targets’ exact location, steal their messages and personal information, or even listen in on phone calls. And as we’ve written about, many Private Sector Offensive Actors (PSOAs) are developing spyware and selling it to whoever is willing to pay, regardless of what their motives are.
A group of nations including the U.S., U.K. and France, along with several Fortune 500 tech companies, signed an agreement Tuesday to work to limit the use of spyware across the globe and crack down harder on bad actors who are illegally selling and using the software. However, the language of the resolution seemed closer to aspirations than actual action.
For their part, the U.S. did roll out new restrictions on the visas of any foreign individuals who misuse commercial spyware. The restrictions could also affect anyone who makes the spyware, profits off its sale or facilitates the sale of the technology.
These are all positive steps in the right direction toward curbing the use and sale of commercial spyware, but I remain concerned that the tendrils of spyware are too deep in the security landscape at this point that we’ll be dealing with this issue for years to come.
Google’s security research group recently found that 20 of the 25 zero-day vulnerabilities Google TAG discovered that were being exploited in the wild in 2023 were exploited by commercial spyware vendors. In the same report, Google TAG said it was actively tracking at least 40 commercial spyware vendors — all with an unknown number of customers, users, creators and employees.
The general tenants of spyware are all around us, too. While not traditional commercial spyware that’s tracking journalists or dissidents, even just quiet trackers are being used all over the internet.
A report from 404 Media last month found that the apps of several popular sites like the 9gag forum and Kik messaging app were part of a massive network of ad tracking. Reporters found that ads inside each app are sending information to a powerful mass monitoring tool, which is then advertised and sold to national security agencies. This information can quietly build profiles out of users that could be used in many ways (though hopefully just for targeted ads, in the absolute best-case scenario), including tracking their hobbies, family members and physical location.
Meta’s popular social media sites Instagram and Facebook have their own sets of tracking tools that can even monitor users’ web activity outside of their apps and require users to manually turn that feature off. Some mercenary groups are even embedding spyware into online ads and spreading spyware with little to no protection on mobile devices.
Just as with ransomware, the problem of addressing spyware and PSOAs is going to take an international, public-private effort, and it certainly won’t be solved overnight. But I believe it will take more than good faith resolutions to change the way our internet activity is tracked, and how attackers can exploit that in a worst-case scenario.
One such way we can start taking steps to immediately curb the spread of spyware is with greater communication. Talos encourages any organization, public or private, to publicly share actionable information or detection content related to spyware discovered in the wild. Public disclosure is often limited in the number of technical details of how the spyware itself works or does not contain many IOCs.
If readers suspect their system(s) may have been compromised by commercial spyware or hack-for-hire groups, please consider notifying Talos’ research team at [email protected] to assist in furthering the community’s knowledge of these threats.
The one big thing
Cisco Talos discovered a new, stealthy espionage campaign that has likely persisted since at least March 2021. The observed activity affects an Islamic non-profit organization using backdoors for a previously unreported malware family named “Zardoor.” Talos believes an advanced threat actor is carrying out this attack, based on the deployment of the custom backdoor Zardoor, the use of modified reverse proxy tools, and the ability to evade detection for several years. In at least one attack, the actors have infected an Islamic charitable non-profit organization in Saudi Arabia, often exfiltrating data multiple times in a month.
Why do I care?
At this time, we have only discovered one compromised target, however, the threat actor’s ability to maintain long-term access to the victim’s network without discovery suggests there could be other victims that we don’t know about yet. This also is the work of a yet-to-be-discovered threat actor, as Talos cannot pin the exact TTPs onto a known threat actor. Zardoor is a dangerous backdoor that can remain undetected for extended periods, and without a ton of prior information about this actor, it’s tough to predict where they might pivot next.
So now what?
Talos has released new ClamAV signatures and Snort rules to protect against Zardoor and the actors’ actions. We don’t know what the initial access vector is, so it’s tough to give targeted advice on how to avoid this malware, but having any endpoint detection in place will block this backdoor.
Top security headlines of the week
Adversaries are actively exploiting three vulnerabilities in Ivanti’s VPN software, including one newly discovered over the weekend. Ivanti first disclosed two vulnerabilities on Jan. 22 affecting Ivanti’s Connect Secure and Policy Secure VPN products. Eventually, attackers took notice and started targeting unpatched instances of the software. Shortly after disclosure, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency only gave federal agencies 48 hours to disconnect any devices that used the affected software. Patches are now available for the three vulnerabilities, and users are encouraged to update as soon as possible. The CISA directive said that “agencies running the affected products must assume domain accounts associated with the affected products have been compromised” and said that agencies should reset “passwords twice for on premise [SIC] accounts, revoke Kerberos tickets, and then revoke tokens for cloud accounts in hybrid deployments” by March 1. It also said, “for cloud joined/registered devices, disable devices in the cloud to revoke the device tokens.” The newest vulnerability, CVE-2024-21893, is a server-side request forgery that could allow an attacker to access certain restricted resources without authentication. (Ars Technica, Decipher)
Apple addressed a security issue early in the life of their newly released Apple Vision Pro, a mixed-reality headset. Days after initial reviews for the product were published, Apple released its first security update for the headset, saying that a vulnerability in the WebKit browser engine “may have been exploited” in the wild. The vulnerability, CVE-2024-23222, also affects other Apple operating systems, including iOS and iPad OS. Vision Pro users also discovered that, before the software patch, they could not reset the password on their device without physically bringing the headset to a retail Apple store. The passcode, typically a series of digits for the headset, could only be reset if the users gave the physical device to Apple support or mailed it to AppleCare. However, Apple added the ability to reset the devices’ passcode in the same patch that fixed the aforementioned vulnerability. (TechCrunch, Bloomberg)
Can’t get enough Talos?
- February Threat Spotlight: Post Compromise Attacks
- How are user credentials stolen and used by threat actors?
- Talos Takes Ep. #171: How are attackers using malicious drivers in Windows to stay undetected?
Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week
SHA 256: 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf
MD5: 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551
Typical Filename: rcx4d83.tmp
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Pykspa::tpd
SHA 256: e4973db44081591e9bff5117946defbef6041397e56164f485cf8ec57b1d8934
MD5: 93fefc3e88ffb78abb36365fa5cf857c
Typical Filename: Wextract
Claimed Product: Internet Explorer
Detection Name: W32.File.MalParent
SHA 256: 4c3c7be970a08dd59e87de24590b938045f14e693a43a83b81ce8531127eb440
MD5: ef6ff172bf3e480f1d633a6c53f7a35e
Typical Filename: iizbpyilb.bat
Claimed Product: N/A
Detection Name: Trojan.Agent.DDOH
SHA 256: 8664e2f59077c58ac12e747da09d2810fd5ca611f56c0c900578bf750cab56b7
MD5: 0e4c49327e3be816022a233f844a5731
Typical Filename: aact.exe
Claimed Product: AAct x86
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Tool.Kmsauto::in03.talos
SHA 256: 77c2372364b6dd56bc787fda46e6f4240aaa0353ead1e3071224d454038a545e
MD5: 040cd888e971f2872d6d5dafd52e6194
Typical Filename: tmp000c3787
Claimed Product: Ultra Virus Killer
Detection Name: PUA.Win.Virus.Ultra::95.sbx.tg
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/threat-source-newsletter-feb-8-2024/