New Attack Against RSA
A reimplemented 2007 attack forges unpadded 1024-bit RSA signatures in 1380 core-years without recovering the private key.
Bruce Schneier notes that a reported new RSA attack is a 2007 forgery method with a fresh implementation. It forges digital signatures on pure, unpadded RSA and does not recover the private key from the public key. The authors forged 1024-bit messages using 1380 CPU core-years. The algorithm is subexponential and somewhat faster than factoring, but not practical against the padded RSA used in real systems.
- Attack is a 2007 result with a new implementation, not a new break.
- Forgery only; it does not recover the RSA private key.
- Works solely on unpadded signatures, not typical real-world RSA.
- 1024-bit forgery took 1380 CPU core-years, about five months.
From the original article
1 min read at schneier.comArsTechnica is reporting on a “new” attack against RSA, one that bypasses factoring. First, this attack isn’t new. The original research is from 2007.
By Bruce Schneier · schneier.com
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