Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour

rPPG deepfake detectors track high-frequency artifacts, not pulse

Original title: Pulse or Provenance? What rPPG-Based Deepfake Detectors Learn

arXiv cs.CRby Othmane Harraq ()1 min read
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Chrominance traces hit AUC 0.998 on talking-face forgeries, and Celeb-DF splits leak identities into the test set.

A study tests what remote-photoplethysmography deepfake detectors learn on Celeb-DF++ (22 forgery methods) and FaceForensics++, using one identically sampled window per real and fake video. On talking-face forgeries, simple chrominance traces reach AUC 0.998 versus 0.87 for a dedicated rPPG extractor, and controlled tests indicate the cue is not physiological. The signal sits above the 0.7–4 Hz heart-rate band, survives resolution, frame-rate and encoding normalization, and is reproduced by an independent reimplementation. Face chrominance models trained on Celeb-DF++ label over 99% of real FF++ videos as fake, and the authors say official Celeb-DF and Celeb-DF++ splits share identities and source video between train and test.

Key facts
  • Shuffling frame order largely removes the signal; a synthetic pulse has little effect.
  • The cue remains discriminative from background regions and from frames without face detection.
  • Removing high-frequency content makes most synthetic videos look real.
  • Custom protocols that reuse test videos inflate weaker detectors by up to 0.30 AUC.
  • A frozen CLIP backbone matches or exceeds fusions with rPPG and frequency features.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Remote photoplethysmography (rPPG) has been proposed as a physiological cue for deepfake detection, based on the premise that synthesized faces lack a genuine cardiac signal. We examine what rPPG-style detectors learn on Celeb-DF++ (22 forgery methods) and FaceForensics++ (FF++), using one identically sampled window per real and fake video. On talking-face forgeries, simple chrominance traces reach an AUC of 0.

arXiv cs.CR

By Othmane Harraq · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.