Skip to content
NewA calmer, faster ZeroHour

Malicious Claude Code extensions on Cursor planted an SSH backdoor

Original title: Hackers Distribute Malicious Claude Code Extension on Cursor Marketplace to Install Persistent SSH Backdoor

GBHackersby Eswar ()3 min read1
Part of a story covered by 13 sourcesBackdoored Claude Code builds on Cursor pulled after 11 hoursMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Cursor says versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 were available from about 2:27 AM to 1:35 PM PDT on October 29.

Microsoft warned that trojanized Claude Code extensions on Cursor’s marketplace tried to install a persistent SSH backdoor. Packages anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 kept normal features while injected JavaScript collected host details and names of credential-like environment variables, not their values. The loader added an Ed25519 key marked svc-telemetry and opened a reverse tunnel to 134.209.82[.]225. Anthropic said it was not compromised. Cursor reported that errors and administrator prompts blocked SSH on most macOS and Windows hosts. Removing the extension does not delete the startup entries.

Unconfirmed: Cursor says SSH access was blocked on most macOS and Windows hosts, so successful intrusion is not established.

Key facts
  • Visual Studio Marketplace and the Claude Code npm distribution were unaffected.
  • Persistence uses a macOS LaunchAgent, a Linux crontab, or a Windows SysMon task.
  • The listed beacon is hxxp://134[.]209[.]82[.]225:8099/beacon.
  • Reporting variable names alone does not show that secret values were stolen.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Persistent SSH access and host reconnaissance on developer machines

ProductAffected
Cursor anthropic.claude-code2.1.312 and 2.1.313
What to do
  1. 1.Identify those extension versions, isolate hosts showing the loader or backdoor, and remove artifacts apart from legitimate SSH config.
  2. 2.Rotate credentials or revoke sessions when exposure is indicated.
  3. 3.Correlate traffic to 134.209.82[.]225, the svc-telemetry key, and the named startup paths.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
ipv4134.209.82.225ion and uses retry loops to reconnect. Microsoft identified 134.209.82[.]225 as the configured SSH and HTTP destination. On macOS, per
sha2567e0a52885fadee05544a9e99eb18c792bec05900a5e1a66d68f8383decb0e278ry point; not a Visual Studio extension (VSIX) package hash 7e0a52885fadee05544a9e99eb18c792bec05900a5e1a66d68f8383decb0e278 SHA256 Decoded tunnel private-key file ~/Library/LaunchAgen
sha256ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15orary tunnel identity; pattern rather than literal filename ecb58cb29078d9646ad1dcdbe51526f2d9cfea06be5fb2ab183e8ecc3ab6bf15 SHA256 JavaScript entry point; not a Visual Studio extensio
urlhttp://134.209.82.225:8099/beacon.]225 IP address Configured remote SSH and HTTP destination hxxp://134[.]209[.]82[.]225:8099/beacon URL Reconnaissance endpoint; correlate with the confi

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Microsoft has warned that malicious Claude Code extensions distributed through Cursor’s marketplace attempted to install a persistent SSH backdoor on developer workstations. The trojanized packages, anthropic. claude-code versions 2.

GBHackers

By Eswar · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.