Chinese Tech Firms Linked to Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaigns
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-0171 | Unauthenticated RCE/DoS in Cisco IOS & IOS XE Smart Install CVE-2018-0171 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) buffer-overflow vulnerability in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE, caused by improper validation of packet data (CWE-20, CWE-787). An unauthenticated, remote attacker can trigger it by simply sending a crafted Smart Install message to TCP port 4786 on an affected device, with no credentials or user interaction required. A successful exploit can cause a device reload, an indefinite loop that triggers a watchdog crash, or arbitrary code execution, giving the attacker full control of the switch or router. Any IOS or IOS XE device running the Smart Install service is affected — a configuration commonly present on Catalyst switches — and devices exposed to the internet on TCP 4786 are at direct risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and both Russian (Static Tundra, FSB-linked) and Chinese (Salt Typhoon) state-sponsored actors have exploited it to compromise unpatched, often end-of-life, Cisco network devices at hundreds of organizations worldwide. Do: Upgrade IOS/IOS XE to a fixed release per Cisco's advisory (Bug ID CSCvg76186); for end-of-life hardware that cannot be patched, plan replacement given active nation-state targeting of unpatched devices. If Smart Install is not in use, disable it with 'no vstack'; otherwise restrict TCP port 4786 with ACLs to trusted management hosts. Audit internet-facing switches and routers for Smart Install enabled and TCP 4786 exposed, and prioritize those devices for remediation. | 9.8 | 99% | KEV |
| mass≈250,000+ internet-exposed devices with TCP/4786 open, on top of a multi-million-device IOS/IOS XE installed base | |
| CVE-2023-20198 | Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation in Cisco IOS XE Web UI (Actively Exploited) CVE-2023-20198 is a critical (CVSS 10.0) unauthenticated privilege escalation flaw in the web UI of Cisco IOS XE software, triggered by sending crafted network requests to the exposed web management interface. An attacker with no credentials can use the flaw to gain initial access and issue a privilege 15 command, creating a local user with normal login access; the attacker then chained CVE-2023-20273 (CVSS 7.2) to elevate that account to root and write an implant to the file system. Successful exploitation yields full administrative control of the device, including persistence via the planted implant, on Cisco IOS XE devices with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or untrusted networks, including Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley Stratix 5200 and 5800 switches running IOS XE. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2023-10-16 with a BOD 23-02 directive, EPSS stands at 99.6% (100th percentile), and ongoing campaigns (including the 'BADCANDY' activity flagged by Australia's ASD and Cisco-related telecom intrusions attributed to Salt Typhoon) have been reported. Do: Upgrade affected devices to the fixed releases listed in Cisco's advisory (use Cisco's Software Checker) and, as immediate mitigation, disable the web UI or restrict it to trusted networks/addresses only. Check for compromise by looking for unexpected local user accounts and the implant artifacts Cisco identified (unexpected cisco_tac_alarm.log and cisco_tac.log files in /tmp or /usr/binos/conf), and immediately report positive findings to CISA per BOD 23-02. Keep in mind that patching alone does not remove a root implant, so devices with evidence of compromise should be reimaged or otherwise cleaned per vendor instructions. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV |
| large≈40,000–50,000 internet-exposed IOS XE devices at the time of disclosure (public scan data), within an IOS XE install base in the millions | |
| CVE-2023-20273 | Authenticated Command Injection (Root) in Cisco IOS XE Web UI CVE-2023-20273 is an OS command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the web UI feature of Cisco IOS XE Software, caused by insufficient input validation. An authenticated, remote attacker triggers it by sending crafted input to the web UI, and a successful exploit injects commands that run on the underlying operating system with root privileges, yielding full device compromise (in the October 2023 mass-exploitation campaign it was typically chained with the unauthenticated CVE-2023-20198 to obtain initial access and install a persistent implant). Any Cisco IOS XE device with the web UI enabled and reachable from the internet or an untrusted network is affected; this data does not specify the affected release ranges, which are enumerated in Cisco's advisory. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV on 2023-10-23 with BOD 23-02 response actions, EPSS is ~90% (100th percentile), and IOS XE edge devices remain recurring targets of Chinese-nexus espionage campaigns (e.g., Salt Typhoon activity against telecoms). Do: Upgrade affected devices to a fixed IOS XE release per Cisco's advisory; as an interim mitigation, disable the HTTP/HTTPS server (ip http server / ip https server) or restrict Web UI access to trusted hosts only. Per BOD 23-02, hunt for compromise on any exposed device — check for unexpected level-15 local accounts and the implant.lua backdoor in flash memory — and immediately report positive findings to CISA. | 7.2 | 90% | KEV |
| mass≈100,000+ internet-exposed IOS XE devices (public scans observed ~40,000+ compromised within days of disclosure) | |
| CVE-2024-21887 | Command Injection RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances contain a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in their web components, triggered when an authenticated administrator sends crafted requests to the appliance. The bug can be chained with the separate authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve the same result. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary commands and code on the appliance, providing a foothold into the networks behind the VPN or network access control gateway. Any organization running these appliances, typically enterprises and government agencies often deployed directly on the internet perimeter, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-10 with known ransomware use and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, although no public proof-of-concept is available. Do: Apply Ivanti's mitigations or patched builds immediately per vendor instructions, addressing the chained authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805 at the same time, and discontinue or restrict use of any appliance for which mitigations are unavailable, especially if it is internet-facing. Because exploitation with ransomware use is known, assume compromise is possible: review appliance web logs for suspicious requests and run Ivanti's integrity-checking guidance to verify appliance images before and after remediation. Where feasible, restrict direct internet exposure of the appliance web interface and monitor for further vendor advisories. | 9.1 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of appliances (roughly 20,000-30,000 internet-exposed ICS gateways at disclosure; total deployed base likely higher) | |
| CVE-2024-3400 | Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent. Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled |
Full article557 words · extracted from infosecurity-magazine.com · click to collapse
The UK, US and partners from across the globe have released a new report on the notorious Chinese APT group Salt Typhoon, claiming it has received help from several commercial tech companies to further its cyber-espionage goals.
The report named Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology, Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology as providing “cyber-related products and services” to China’s intelligence services.
“The data stolen through this activity against foreign telecommunications and Internet service providers (ISPs), as well as intrusions in the lodging and transportation sectors, ultimately can provide Chinese intelligence services with the capability to identify and track their targets’ communications and movements around the world,” it warned.
These efforts have been ongoing since at least 2021, with the focus for initial access on exploitation of known vulnerabilities rather than zero-days.
Read more on Salt Typhoon: Salt Typhoon Exploited Cisco Devices With Custom Tool to Spy on US Telcos
The report urged network defenders in potentially impacted organizations to prioritize patching of network edge devices, specifically the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2024-21887 (Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure)
- CVE-2024-3400 (Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect)
- CVE-2023-20273 and CVE-2023-20198 (Cisco IOS XE)
- CVE-2018-0171 (Cisco Smart Install RCE)
By exploiting the above, threat actors can gain access to routers and edge devices, and then potentially hijack trusted connections between providers and customers to pivot into other networks.
“The APT actors leverage infrastructure, such as virtual private servers (VPSs) and compromised intermediate routers, that have not been attributable to a publicly known botnet or obfuscation network infrastructure to target telecommunications and network service providers, including ISPs,” the report explained.
“The APT actors may target edge devices regardless of who owns a particular device. Devices owned by entities who do not align with the actors’ core targets of interest still present opportunities for use in attack pathways into targets of interest.”
Reports suggest that these techniques were used to compromise organizations in scores of countries worldwide.
Network Defenders Urged to Act Now
The latest report comes on the back of warnings last November that Salt Typhoon had breached at least eight US telecom firms in “a broad and significant cyber espionage campaign.”
The hackers obtained customer call records data and the private communications of a limited number of people involved in government or political activity, as well as information subject to US law enforcement requests.
The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) even warned at the time that high-risk individuals should move away from using unencrypted SMS and adopt end-to-end encrypted messaging apps and phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA).
The latest advisory was signed by the UK, US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain, indicating the scale of Salt Typhoon operations.
“We are deeply concerned by the irresponsible behavior of the named commercial entities based in China that has enabled an unrestrained campaign of malicious cyber activities on a global scale,” said NCSC CEO, Richard Horne.
“It is crucial organizations in targeted critical sectors heed this international warning about the threat posed by cyber actors who have been exploiting publicly known – and so therefore fixable – vulnerabilities.”
Horne urged network defenders to proactively hunt for malicious activity and apply recommended mitigations based on indicators of compromise (IoCs), as well as regularly review network device logs for signs of unusual activity.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/chinese-tech-firms-salt-typhoon/