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US Sanctions Russia and Expels 10 Diplomats Over SolarWinds Cyberattack

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2018-13379
Unauthenticated Path Traversal in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN

CVE-2018-13379 is a path traversal flaw (CWE-22) in the Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN web portal that allows an unauthenticated attacker to download FortiOS system files via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. By traversing directories through crafted requests to the exposed web portal, the attacker can retrieve sensitive files, a technique publicly documented as yielding the SSL VPN session file containing usernames and passwords in plaintext. Any organization running the SSL VPN web portal on a FortiGate appliance is affected, and risk is highest where the portal is directly reachable from the internet. The flaw is confirmed in the wild: it was added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days. No public PoC is listed in the provided data, but credential theft tied to this bug has been widely reused by threat actors.

Do: Apply the patched FortiOS release per Fortinet's vendor advisory immediately, as this is a CISA KEV required action; if the fixed version is not known from this data, follow Fortinet's FG-IR-18-384 advisory for the correct upgrade path. Rotate SSL VPN credentials and review VPN access logs for path-traversal requests, since successful exploitation exposes plaintext session credentials, and restrict SSL VPN portal exposure to trusted sources where possible.

9.8100% KEV ransomware
  • Fortinet FortiOS
mass≈500,000 internet-exposed FortiOS SSL VPN portals (Fortinet cited ~480,000 affected devices)
CVE-2019-11510
Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read in Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure VPN

Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure, an enterprise SSL VPN appliance, contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability (CWE-22, path traversal) that requires no authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the appliance over HTTPS can send a specially crafted URI containing traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the device. The attacker gains access to sensitive appliance files, potentially including configuration or credential material useful for further compromise, and CISA records known ransomware use of this flaw. Any organization running Pulse Connect Secure, especially gateways exposed to the internet for remote access, is affected. Exploitation is established: CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, and no public PoC is known.

Do: Apply updates per Ivanti's instructions, the required action in the CISA KEV entry, prioritizing internet-facing Pulse Connect Secure gateways, and consult the vendor advisory for the applicable fixed release since no version range is provided here. Where patching is not immediate, restrict HTTPS access to the appliance and hunt for signs of exploitation (unexpected file reads, anomalous VPN logins or sessions, and follow-on ransomware activity), as CISA reports known ransomware use.

10.0100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure
largeTens of thousands of internet-exposed gateways (order of 10,000-100,000 systems; each typically serves hundreds of VPN users, so potentially millions of users)
CVE-2019-19781
Unauthenticated path traversal RCE in Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP

CVE-2019-19781 is a path-traversal flaw (classified CWE-22, though CISA's description calls it unspecified) in Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler ADC), Citrix Gateway, and Citrix SD-WAN WANOP appliances that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker traverse directories via crafted requests and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance, typically with root privileges. It is triggered by sending specially crafted directory-traversal requests (crafted URLs/requests to the appliance's management or VPN endpoints), which lets the attacker write files and run commands with no credentials. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution on the appliance, enabling theft of VPN/ADC credentials, lateral movement into the corporate network, and installation of persistent backdoors. Any organization running affected ADC, Gateway, or SD-WAN WANOP firmware is affected, with internet-facing gateways used for remote access at the highest risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the vulnerability is on CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, EPSS assigns near-certain (100.0%) probability of exploitation within 30 days, and no public PoC is listed despite confirmed abuse.

Do: Upgrade Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP appliances to the fixed firmware builds listed in Citrix advisory CTX267020; if patching cannot be done immediately, apply Citrix's published interim mitigation and restrict internet exposure to the appliance. Because exploitation grants root code execution and persistence, after patching hunt for indicators of compromise (unexpected nsroot account, modified system files, crontab/scheduled entries), kill all active and inactive sessions, and rotate appliance and VPN credentials. Prioritize internet-facing gateways and comply with CISA's required action to apply vendor updates.

9.8100% KEV ransomware
  • Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) Supported ADC firmware lines in effect at disclosure (10.5, 11.0, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, 13.0) prior to patched builds, per Citrix advisory CTX267020; exact builds n
  • Citrix Gateway Supported Gateway firmware lines (sharing the ADC codebase, same affected releases 10.5-13.0) prior to patched builds, per Citrix advisory; exact builds not spe
  • Citrix SD-WAN WANOP Appliance Affected appliance models (4000, 4100, 5000, 5100) running pre-patch firmware in the 10.2.1-11.4.1 range, per Citrix advisory; exact builds not specified in the
massroughly 80,000-100,000+ internet-exposed Citrix ADC/Gateway appliances at the time of disclosure, with a far larger total installed base (including…
CVE-2019-9670
XML External Entity (XXE) Injection in Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS)

Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) contains an improper restriction of XML external entity (XXE) vulnerability (CWE-611) in its mailboxd component, meaning XML parsing accepts external entity references that the parser should restrict. By submitting crafted XML that ZCS parses in mailboxd, an attacker can typically direct the server to fetch external entities, potentially disclosing local files or issuing server-side requests; the available data does not specify authentication requirements or exact affected version ranges. Organizations running Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite are affected. The flaw is confirmed as exploited in the wild: CISA added CVE-2019-9670 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-01-10, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days; no public PoC is listed and ransomware association is listed as unknown.

Do: Apply updates per Synacor/Zimbra instructions, as required by the CISA KEV catalog; because no fixed version numbers are provided in the available data, administrators of all ZCS deployments should consult current vendor advisories and patch promptly. As interim mitigation, restrict or disable external entity resolution in XML processing and limit exposure of mailboxd-facing services. Check mailboxd logs and outbound network activity for signs of entity resolution or unexpected connections, and prioritize this fix given the 2022-01-10 KEV listing and 100% EPSS score.

9.8100% KEV PoC ×3
  • Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS)
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed ZCS servers (estimate; user impact likely higher)
CVE-2020-4006
Command Injection in VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager

CVE-2020-4006 is a command injection flaw (CWE-78, CVSS 3.1 9.1) in the admin consoles of VMware Workspace ONE Access, Workspace ONE Access Connector, VMware Identity Manager, and VMware Identity Manager Connector, with the affected components also shipped inside VMware Cloud Foundation and vRealize Suite Lifecycle Manager. An attacker who gains privileged access to an admin console, which is typically reachable over the network, can inject and run arbitrary commands on the appliance, achieving full compromise of the host with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact and a changed scope. Organizations running the affected identity products are exposed, especially where the admin console is internet-facing or reachable from untrusted networks. The bug was actively exploited by Russian state-sponsored (SVR/APT29) actors against unpatched deployments, prompting a CISA emergency directive, NSA and FBI joint warnings, and inclusion in the KEV catalog; EPSS estimates a 17.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days, and no public proof-of-concept is known.

Do: Apply the patches VMware released in its November 2020 advisory (VMSA-2020-0027) for all affected products, connectors, and any Cloud Foundation or vRealize Suite Lifecycle Manager deployments that embed the components — this is a KEV-required action. As an interim mitigation, restrict network access to the admin console (typically port 8443) to trusted users and networks only. Review admin-console and system logs for signs of command injection or SVR/APT29 activity, since the bug was exploited in the wild by Russian state-sponsored actors.

9.117% KEV
  • VMware Workspace ONE Access multiple affected releases (3.x/20.x lines) — see VMware security advisory
  • VMware Workspace ONE Access Connector multiple affected releases (3.x/20.x lines) — see VMware security advisory
  • VMware Identity Manager multiple affected releases (3.x/20.x lines) — see VMware security advisory
  • +3 more
largetens of thousands of enterprise identity-appliance deployments, with likely several thousand admin consoles internet-exposed
Full article815 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

The U.S. and U.K. on Thursday formally attributed the supply chain attack of IT infrastructure management company SolarWinds with "high confidence" to government operatives working for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

"Russia's pattern of malign behaviour around the world – whether in cyberspace, in election interference or in the aggressive operations of their intelligence services – demonstrates that Russia remains the most acute threat to the U.K.'s national and collective security," the U.K. government said in a statement.

To that effect, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has imposed sweeping sanctions against Russia for "undermining the conduct of free and fair elections and democratic institutions" in the U.S. and for its role in facilitating the sprawling SolarWinds hack, while also barring six technology companies in the country that provide support to the cyber program run by Russian Intelligence Services.

The companies include ERA Technopolis, Pasit, Federal State Autonomous Scientific Establishment Scientific Research Institute Specialized Security Computing Devices and Automation (SVA), Neobit, Advanced System Technology, and Pozitiv Teknolodzhiz (Positive Technologies), the last three of which are IT security firms whose customers are said to include the Russian Ministry of Defense, SVR, and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).

"As a company, we deny the groundless accusations made by the U.S. Department of the Treasury," Positive Technologies said in a statement. "In the almost 20 years we have been operating there has been no evidence of the results of Positive Technologies’ research being used in violation of the principles of business transparency and the ethical exchange of information with the professional information security community."

In addition, the Biden administration is also expelling ten members of Russia's diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., including representatives of its intelligence services.

"The scope and scale of this compromise combined with Russia's history of carrying out reckless and disruptive cyber operations makes it a national security concern," the Treasury Department said. "The SVR has put at risk the global technology supply chain by allowing malware to be installed on the machines of tens of thousands of SolarWinds' customers."

For its part, Moscow had previously denied involvement in the broad-scope SolarWinds campaign, stating "it does not conduct offensive operations in the cyber domain."

The intrusions came to light in December 2020 when FireEye and other cybersecurity firms revealed that the operators behind the espionage campaign managed to compromise the software build and code signing infrastructure of SolarWinds Orion platform as early as October 2019 to deliver the Sunburst backdoor with the goal of gathering sensitive information.

Up to 18,000 SolarWinds customers are believed to have received the trojanized Orion update, although the attackers carefully selected their targets, opting to escalate the attacks only in a handful of cases by deploying Teardrop malware based on an initial reconnaissance of the target environment for high-value accounts and assets.

The adversary's compromise of the SolarWinds software supply chain is said to have given it the ability to remotely spy or potentially disrupt more than 16,000 computer systems worldwide, according to the executive order issued by the U.S. government.

Besides infiltrating the networks of Microsoft, FireEye, Malwarebytes, and Mimecast, the attackers are also said to have used SolarWinds as a stepping stone to breaching several U.S. agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and the National Institutes of Health.

The SVR actor is also known by other names such as APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes, with the threat group being tracked under different monikers, including UNC2452 (FireEye), SolarStorm (Palo Alto Unit 42), StellarParticle (CrowdStrike), Dark Halo (Volexity), and Nobelium (Microsoft).

Furthermore, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have jointly released an advisory, warning businesses of active exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities by APT29 to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks —

In a statement shared with The Hacker News, Pulse Secure said the issue identified by the NSA concerns a flaw that was patched on legacy deployments in April 2019, and that "customers who followed the instructions in a Pulse Secure security advisory issued at that time have properly protected their systems and mitigated the threat."

"We see what Russia is doing to undermine our democracies," said U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. "The U.K. and U.S. are calling out Russia's malicious behaviour, to enable our international partners and businesses at home to better defend and prepare themselves against this kind of action."

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html