HPQ-AKE: A Provably Secure Sign-Less Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Bandwidth-Constrained IoT and Edge Networks
HPQ-AKE replaces transcript signatures with dual KEMs, cutting modeled IoT handshake size 56.4% versus hybrid TLS 1.3.
HPQ-AKE is a sign-less hybrid authenticated key exchange for RSA-enabled IoT gateways and edge services. It uses ML-KEM-768 for post-quantum session and forward secrecy and RSA-OAEP for implicit mutual authentication, avoiding large post-quantum certificate signatures. The authors claim AKE security, forward secrecy, and conditional key-compromise impersonation resistance under Module-LWE and RSA. Modeling shows handshake traffic falling from 13,009 to 5,668 bytes versus a Hybrid TLS 1.3 full handshake, with 7.11 ms local computation on x86 and 1,914 ms median latency on a simulated 50 kbps, 600 ms RTT link.
- HPQ-AKE pairs ML-KEM-768 secrecy with RSA-OAEP implicit authentication, avoiding post-quantum signatures.
- Security is argued in an extended Bellare-Rogaway model under Module-LWE and RSA.
- Modeled handshake size drops from 13,009 to 5,668 bytes, a 56.4% reduction.
- On a simulated 50 kbps, 600 ms RTT link, median latency is 1,914 ms versus 2,791 ms.
- Results are x86-based; ARM gateways and microcontrollers remain unvalidated.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgSecuring bandwidth-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) and edge networks during post-quantum migration creates an authentication trade-off: ML-KEM provides post-quantum key establishment, whereas post-quantum signatures increase certificate-chain size, verification cost, and handshake latency.
By Khiem Pham-Tuan · arxiv.org
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