Scalable Composition of Byzantine Agreements under Reorder Attacks
Researchers present the first adversary model combining party corruption with channel reordering attacks, establishing tight security thresholds for composed Byzantine agreement protocols.
The paper presents the first adversary model combining party corruption with adversarial channel attacks that reorder messages across multiple Byzantine agreement executions. It proves impossibility results for authenticated BA under parallel composition when n ≤ 3t or n ≤ 2c + 2t + 1, with matching possibility results when n > max{3t, 2c + 2t + 1}. The authors provide general black-box compilers plus erasure-correcting-code variants that achieve constant multiplicative communication overhead for long messages.
- First adversary model combining party corruption with channel reordering attacks for Byzantine agreement.
- Impossibility at n ≤ 3t or n ≤ 2c + 2t + 1, with matching possibility bounds shown tight.
- Black-box compilers secure single-instance BA protocols under parallel and concurrent composition without extra assumptions.
- Erasure-correcting-code variants reduce communication to constant multiplicative overhead for long messages.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgByzantine agreement (BA) is a foundational building block in distributed systems, and the security analysis of BA protocols under multi-instance executions has attracted increasing attention. However, most existing adversary models focus solely on party corruption and neglect important threats posed by adversarial manipulations of communication channels in the network.
By Jing Chen · arxiv.org
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