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Hackers Can Turn Vulnerable LiteLLM AI Gateways Into Root Access and Cloud Credential Theft

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read4 · 2 reads
AI summary · glm-5.3-flashSummaries by Vani AI

Wiz found multiple LiteLLM AI gateway flaws, including a CVE-2026-59822 MCP auth bypass added to CISA KEV, enabling root code execution and cloud credential theft.

An internet scan of 3,074 exposed LiteLLM instances found 294 (9.6%) accepting the default sk-1234 master key and 191 (6.2%) requiring no authentication. CVE-2026-59822 lets a single-character Bearer token establish a valid MCP session via an OAuth2 fallback in versions before 1.84.0; the flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CVE-2026-59821 allows Python code execution as root in the gateway container via unsanitized Custom Code Guardrails registration before 1.82.0-stable, and CVE-2026-35029 permits config changes leading to RCE and admin takeover. Admin access plus pass-through endpoints can reach cloud metadata services to steal IAM credentials.

Key facts
  • 9.6% of exposed LiteLLM gateways accept default sk-1234 master key
  • CVE-2026-59822 MCP bypass added to CISA KEV, exploited in the wild
  • Guardrails flaw yields root code execution inside gateway container
  • Pass-through endpoints can target EC2 IMDS to steal IAM credentials
  • Upgrade to 1.84.0+ and replace default keys with strong unique keys
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Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2026-35029
Broken Access Control in LiteLLM AI Gateway Enables Authenticated RCE
8.725%
CVE-2026-59821
LiteLLM: LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create and update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the…
2.1<1%
CVE-2026-59822
Unauthenticated MCP Endpoint Authentication Bypass in BerriAI LiteLLM
8.8<1%KEV
KEV

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Nearly one in 10 internet-exposed LiteLLM AI gateways accepted the widely documented default master key, sk-1234, or required no authentication, creating a direct path to LLMjacking, sensitive credential exposure, and in vulnerable versions root-level code execution inside the gateway container. Their internet scan of 3,074 publicly reachable instances found that 294 systems, or 9. 6%, accepted […]

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.