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North Korean IT Workers Pay People to Sit Through Job Interviews While They Control the Computer
Silent Push found North Korean IT workers recruiting on-camera proxies for job interviews while remotely controlling the computer, defeating identity and location checks.
Silent Push researchers engaged the "Tec Guru" persona via Discord and Telegram and assessed with moderate-to-high confidence that the operator is a North Korean IT worker recruiting on-camera proxies in the US, Europe, and Latin America for a 35/65 revenue split. During Google Meet interviews, the proxy stays on camera while the real worker supplies answers via ChatGPT-generated prompts, real-time messaging, or remote-control tools such as AnyDesk and TeamViewer. Successfully placed workers can access source code, cloud tenants, and CI/CD systems, and payments create sanctions exposure; the US, Japan, South Korea, and eight other governments issued a joint identity-verification alert on July 31, 2026.
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North Korean remote workers are broadening their job hunt beyond IT
Huntress links suspected North Korean remote workers to sales, marketing, and healthcare jobs using stolen identities, VPNs, proxies, and KVM hardware.
Huntress investigations identified suspected DPRK remote workers hired beyond IT in sales, marketing, and healthcare/financial organizations, sometimes actually performing the work they were hired for. Fraudulent documents included passports from the same city issued one day apart, ID cards with identical validity dates, and electricity bills built from the same online template with matching typos. A financial-services case found a PiKVM and Guermok USB capture card on a new hire's laptop within hours of delivery, suggesting a laptop farm, and another hire used a police mugshot with the photo digitally swapped. Researchers urge rigorous background checks and identity verification at the interview stage.
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Hackers Impersonate IT Support on Microsoft Teams to Take Control of Employee PCs
Microsoft warns of a human-operated campaign where attackers pose as IT support in Teams to gain remote PC control and reach domain controllers.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed attackers abusing Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT/helpdesk staff, persuading employees to grant screen control via Quick Assist or RMM tools. Operators deploy malicious MSI packages via silent msiexec, run encrypted JavaScript implants through portable Node.js, and persist via EdgeUpdate Run keys or Startup folder entries. The Node.js backdoor uses HTTPS long-polling C2, captures screenshots, enumerates Active Directory, and moves laterally over WinRM (TCP 5985) to domain controllers and certificate authorities. Initial access maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1566.003 (Spearphishing via Service); no Teams vulnerability is exploited.
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⚡ Weekly Recap: NFC Fraud, Curly COMrades, N
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Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence
Phishing emails with browser-in-the-browser fake Adobe pages trick users into installing rogue ScreenConnect clients granting persistent remote access.
Huntress SOC investigated two August incidents where phishing links led to fake CAPTCHA checks and Adobe PDF Reader lures rendered as browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) pages spoofing legitimate domains like get.adobe.com. Victims downloaded what they believed was Acrobat Reader but actually installed ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe from attacker infrastructure, yielding two rogue ScreenConnect clients with service-based persistence. The attacker used cmd.exe and curl to stage a second client connecting to 144.172.115.59, leveraged a ScreenConnect Trial Relay domain for stealth, and ran HideCursor.exe as a defense-evasion binary. Incident 2 arrived via AT&T Office@Hand (RingCentral), with both chains stopped before broader impact.
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