Malcious Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin backdoors 1,500 WordPress sites
Compromised Admin Menu Editor Pro update server distributed backdoored plugin versions installing web shells and hidden admin accounts on roughly 1,500 WordPress sites.
A threat actor with root-level access to adminmenueditor.com pushed trojanized Admin Menu Editor Pro versions 2.35 and 2.36 containing includes/wp-user-consent.php, which installed a web shell and created a hidden wp_-prefixed user account. At least 230 customers and roughly 1,500 sites installed the malicious update, with several hundred more downloads possibly affected. Developer Janis Elsts took the site offline after the attacker recompromised the clean 2.36 release; version 2.34 and the free plugin are believed unaffected.
Give every teammate and agent the right level of access to your Workers
Cloudflare launches per-Worker granular access controls with four roles, enabling least-privilege access for teammates, AI agents, and CI/CD pipelines.
Cloudflare announced granular authorization for Workers, letting admins scope access to a single Worker instead of the whole account. Four new roles are available: Metadata Read-Only (observability without source code), Content Read-Only (read code without changes), Editor (deploy without delete), and Admin (full control of one Worker). Roles apply at Developer Platform, product, or resource level, can be attached to dashboard users or API tokens, and are available to all customers now, with plans to extend to D1, R2, and KV.
Open VSX Removes 77 Malicious Evil Twin Extensions Exfiltrating Developer Data
77 malicious 'evil twin' Open VSX extensions impersonated developer tools and exfiltrated hostnames and detailed workspace reconnaissance to mangorbit.com.
Manifold Security found 77 extensions uploaded to the Open VSX marketplace between July 26 and August 1, 2026 that impersonate real Microsoft VS Code Marketplace tools, with all 77 sending data to mangorbit.com. 58 lightweight variants exfiltrate the hostname, while 19 recon variants collect editor details, OS username, Git remote hosts, CI environment variables (GitHub, GitLab, Azure DevOps, Buildkite, CircleCI, Codespaces, Gitpod), and installed extension IDs. The recon variant retries for up to seven days and can fall back to a DNS TXT record for exfiltration if the primary domain is blocked. The extensions were removed from Open VSX by August 3, 2026; the disclosure follows a separate npm supply chain campaign, ChainDrop, which compromised 450 packages with a Shai-Hulud worm variant.