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Bitter APT adds Bangladesh to their targets

Cisco Talos ()11 min read2 · 1 read
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Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2017-11882
Memory Corruption RCE in Microsoft Office via Legacy Equation Editor
7.8100%KEVRansomwarePoC ×10
KEV
CVE-2018-0798
+1 related CVE
Memory Corruption RCE in Microsoft Office Equation Editor (CVE-2018-0798)
8.8
group max
95%KEV
KEV
CVE-2021-28310
Out-of-Bounds Write in Microsoft Win32k Allows Local Privilege Escalation on Windows 10
7.88%KEV
KEV

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainautodefragapp.comdefragapp[.]com. Its WhoIs record indicates that the domain autodefragapp[.]com registered it in November 2020, and later updated it on N
domaindesto.gov.pkil addresses from this campaign: cdrrab13bd@gmail[.]com arc@desto[.]gov[.]pk so.dc@pc[.]gov[.]pk mem_psd@pc[.]gov[.]pk chief_pia@pc[
domainhelpdesk.autodefragapp.comcture The actor's infrastructure consists of the C2 server (helpdesk[.]autodefragapp[.]com) and several domains that host the adversary's malware,
domainlevarisnetqlsvc.netreat are 59736 and 300132. IOC Domains olmajhnservice[.]com levarisnetqlsvc[.]net urocakpmpanel[.]com tomcruefrshsvc[.]com autodefragapp[.]
domainmswsceventlog.neths and the constants. The 99[.]83[.]154[.]118 IP also hosts mswsceventlog[.]net, according to Cisco Umbrella, a domain that was previousl
domainolmajhnservice.comin an encrypted format that connects to the malicious host olmajhnservice[.]com and downloads the payload from the URL hxxp[:]//olmajhnse
domainpc.gov.pkcampaign: cdrrab13bd@gmail[.]com arc@desto[.]gov[.]pk so.dc@pc[.]gov[.]pk mem_psd@pc[.]gov[.]pk chief_pia@pc[.]gov[.]pk rab3tikat
domainpof.gov.pk]pk chief_pia@pc[.]gov[.]pk rab3tikatuly@gmail[.]com ddscm2@pof[.]gov[.]pk The infection chain The infection chain begins with the
domaintomcruefrshsvc.comajhnservice[.]com levarisnetqlsvc[.]net urocakpmpanel[.]com tomcruefrshsvc[.]com autodefragapp[.]com helpdesk[.]autodefragapp[.]com URLs h
domainurocakpmpanel.com132. IOC Domains olmajhnservice[.]com levarisnetqlsvc[.]net urocakpmpanel[.]com tomcruefrshsvc[.]com autodefragapp[.]com helpdesk[.]autod
ipv499.83.154.118se this C2 in previous campaigns. The C2 domain resolved to 99[.]83[.]154[.]118 during the period of the campaign. This is a legitima
sha104a75df9b60290efb1a2d934570ad203a23f4e9c500c04acda5dc1cc4e 530f597666afc147886f5ad651b5071d0cc894ba 04a75df9b60290efb1a2d934570ad203a23f4e9c aeb02ac0c0f0793651f32a3c0f594ce79ba99e82 Documents b0b68797
sha10cbf8c7ff9faf01a9b5c3874e9a9d49cbbf5037b/]urocakpmpanel[.]com/nt[.]php SSL Certificates Thumbprints 0cbf8c7ff9faf01a9b5c3874e9a9d49cbbf5037b 25092b60d972e574ed593a468564de2394fa008b 4fbde39a0735d1ad75
sha125092b60d972e574ed593a468564de2394fa008bicates Thumbprints 0cbf8c7ff9faf01a9b5c3874e9a9d49cbbf5037b 25092b60d972e574ed593a468564de2394fa008b 4fbde39a0735d1ad757038072cf541dfdc65faa3 5a972665b590cc77dc
sha14fbde39a0735d1ad757038072cf541dfdc65faa374e9a9d49cbbf5037b 25092b60d972e574ed593a468564de2394fa008b 4fbde39a0735d1ad757038072cf541dfdc65faa3 5a972665b590cc77dcdfb4500c04acda5dc1cc4e 530f597666afc14788
sha1530f597666afc147886f5ad651b5071d0cc894ba072cf541dfdc65faa3 5a972665b590cc77dcdfb4500c04acda5dc1cc4e 530f597666afc147886f5ad651b5071d0cc894ba 04a75df9b60290efb1a2d934570ad203a23f4e9c aeb02ac0c0f0793651
sha15a972665b590cc77dcdfb4500c04acda5dc1cc4e468564de2394fa008b 4fbde39a0735d1ad757038072cf541dfdc65faa3 5a972665b590cc77dcdfb4500c04acda5dc1cc4e 530f597666afc147886f5ad651b5071d0cc894ba 04a75df9b60290efb1
sha1aeb02ac0c0f0793651f32a3c0f594ce79ba99e82d651b5071d0cc894ba 04a75df9b60290efb1a2d934570ad203a23f4e9c aeb02ac0c0f0793651f32a3c0f594ce79ba99e82 Documents b0b687977eee41ee7c3ed0d9d179e8c00181f0c0db64eebc0
sha2563fdf291e39e93305ebc9df19ba480ebd60845053b0b606a620bf482d0f09f4d32faa3da831976fee90860ac39d50484b20bee692ce7f0ec35a15670fa92 3fdf291e39e93305ebc9df19ba480ebd60845053b0b606a620bf482d0f09f4d3 69b397400043ec7036e23c225d8d562fdcd3be887f0d076b93f6fcaae8f
sha256490e9582b00e2622e56447f76de4c038ae0b658a022e6bc44f9eb0ddf0720de6eec6d1869498f2fca8f989125326b2d8cee8dcacf3bc9315ae7566963db 490e9582b00e2622e56447f76de4c038ae0b658a022e6bc44f9eb0ddf0720de6 b7765ff16309baacff3b19d1a1a5dd7850a1640392f64f19353e8a608b5
sha25669b397400043ec7036e23c225d8d562fdcd3be887f0d076b93f6fcaae8f3dd6191e39e93305ebc9df19ba480ebd60845053b0b606a620bf482d0f09f4d3 69b397400043ec7036e23c225d8d562fdcd3be887f0d076b93f6fcaae8f3dd61 90fd32f8f7b494331ab1429712b1735c3d864c8c8a2461a5ab67b050238
sha25690fd32f8f7b494331ab1429712b1735c3d864c8c8a2461a5ab67b050238217877400043ec7036e23c225d8d562fdcd3be887f0d076b93f6fcaae8f3dd61 90fd32f8f7b494331ab1429712b1735c3d864c8c8a2461a5ab67b05023821787
sha256b0b687977eee41ee7c3ed0d9d179e8c00181f0c0db64eebc0005a5c6325e8a82a23f4e9c aeb02ac0c0f0793651f32a3c0f594ce79ba99e82 Documents b0b687977eee41ee7c3ed0d9d179e8c00181f0c0db64eebc0005a5c6325e8a82 f7ed5eec6d1869498f2fca8f989125326b2d8cee8dcacf3bc9315ae7566
sha256b7765ff16309baacff3b19d1a1a5dd7850a1640392f64f19353e8a608b5a28c5582b00e2622e56447f76de4c038ae0b658a022e6bc44f9eb0ddf0720de6 b7765ff16309baacff3b19d1a1a5dd7850a1640392f64f19353e8a608b5a28c5 ce922a20a73182c18101dae7e5acfc240deb43c1007709c20ea74c1dd35
sha256ce922a20a73182c18101dae7e5acfc240deb43c1007709c20ea74c1dd35d2b12ff16309baacff3b19d1a1a5dd7850a1640392f64f19353e8a608b5a28c5 ce922a20a73182c18101dae7e5acfc240deb43c1007709c20ea74c1dd35d2b12 e4545764e0c54ed1e1321a038fa2c1921b5b70a591c95b24127f1b9de72
sha256e4545764e0c54ed1e1321a038fa2c1921b5b70a591c95b24127f1b9de7212af8a20a73182c18101dae7e5acfc240deb43c1007709c20ea74c1dd35d2b12 e4545764e0c54ed1e1321a038fa2c1921b5b70a591c95b24127f1b9de7212af8 Payload fa0ed2faa3da831976fee90860ac39d50484b20bee692ce7f0e
sha256f7ed5eec6d1869498f2fca8f989125326b2d8cee8dcacf3bc9315ae7566963db7977eee41ee7c3ed0d9d179e8c00181f0c0db64eebc0005a5c6325e8a82 f7ed5eec6d1869498f2fca8f989125326b2d8cee8dcacf3bc9315ae7566963db 490e9582b00e2622e56447f76de4c038ae0b658a022e6bc44f9eb0ddf07
sha256fa0ed2faa3da831976fee90860ac39d50484b20bee692ce7f0ec35a15670fa92ed1e1321a038fa2c1921b5b70a591c95b24127f1b9de7212af8 Payload fa0ed2faa3da831976fee90860ac39d50484b20bee692ce7f0ec35a15670fa92 3fdf291e39e93305ebc9df19ba480ebd60845053b0b606a620bf482d0f0
urlhttp://olmajhnservice./nxl/nxolmajhnservice[.]com and downloads the payload from the URL hxxp[:]//olmajhnservice[.]/nxl/nx. The payload is downloaded in the folder "C:\$Utf" crea

From the original article

11 min read at blog.talosintelligence.com

Cisco Talos has observed an ongoing malicious campaign since August 2021 from the Bitter APT group that appears to target users in Bangladesh, a change from the attackers' usual victims. As part of this, there's a new trojan based on Apost Talos is calling "ZxxZ," that, among other features, includes remote file execution capability.

Cisco Talos

blog.talosintelligence.com

Read the full article at Cisco Talos

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.