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HVNC Backdoor Targets LATAM Organizations with Fake Tax and DocuSign Lures
A custom HVNC backdoor is targeting Latin American financial organizations via fake DocuSign and NFe tax-document lures, giving attackers hidden persistent remote access.
ANY.RUN researchers analyzed a multi-stage phishing campaign delivering a custom HVNC backdoor to banking and financial organizations in Latin America. The chain starts with fake DocuSign and NFe tax-document pages that serve per-visitor ZIP archives, followed by an LNK dropper, an NSIS loader, and a 64-bit backdoor masquerading as Windows Update Assistant. The implant provides hidden remote desktop control, keystroke monitoring, Firefox data theft, Startup-folder persistence, and EDR-aware behavior, communicating over TCP/27015.
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NovaCookies Campaigns Abuse Genuine Docusign Notifications to Steal Microsoft 365 Sessions
NovaCookies AitM phishing kit, a Sneaky 2FA variant, uses genuine Docusign lures to steal Microsoft 365 sessions at hundreds of organizations.
Island disclosed NovaCookies, a $320/month adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service platform that relays Microsoft 365 sign-ins through attacker infrastructure to capture credentials, MFA codes, and authenticated sessions. Campaigns abuse genuine Docusign envelopes and Microsoft/Google redirect hops so each step looks legitimate, with lure domains on .vu and alternating-case labels such as PwPt-sHaRe. Proofpoint assesses NovaCookies as a Sneaky 2FA variant with added flows for Okta and Entra domains federated to GoDaddy, and a fully managed PhaaS model. It has targeted hundreds of organizations in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, Israel, and the U.A.E., and is advertised via Telegram with anti-analysis checks like a Cloudflare gate.
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New Phishing Attack Uses Blob URLs to Hide Malicious Pages From Security Scanners
Barracuda detailed a DocuSign-themed phishing campaign that renders credential-harvesting pages as browser blob URLs, evading URL reputation and blocklist defenses.
Barracuda researchers report a credential-harvesting phishing campaign that starts with a DocuSign-themed email containing a calendar invitation and routes victims through legitimate Microsoft OAuth endpoints and Microsoft Teams. A crafted redirect parameter leads Teams to load external content from cdn.bloom[.]io, which the browser renders as a blob URL — a session-only address held in local memory with no persistent public URL to crawl, categorize, or blocklist. The locally generated page registers a service worker, runs inside a sandboxed iframe, and is dynamically steered by backend infrastructure, indicating a centrally managed phishing platform. Barracuda recommends phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys and passkeys, monitoring OAuth flows and redirect chains, and Teams malicious URL protection.
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Hackers Use Blob URLs and Microsoft Teams to Create Phishing Pages Inside Victims’ Browsers
Barracuda details a phishing campaign using Microsoft Teams OAuth redirects and browser blob URLs to render local fake DocuSign login pages for credential theft.
Barracuda researchers identified an active phishing campaign that routes DocuSign-themed emails with calendar invites through a Microsoft OAuth endpoint and crafted redirects into Microsoft Teams, then renders a fake sign-in page via a browser-generated blob URL. Because the page is assembled locally in memory and can register service workers and run in a sandboxed iframe, URL-reputation checks largely see legitimate Microsoft domains. The goal is credential theft and account takeover, not a flaw in Teams itself.
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Cybercriminals are building phishing pages that exist only inside victims’ browsers
Barracuda details a DocuSign-themed phishing campaign that renders login pages locally via blob URLs, abusing genuine Microsoft OAuth and Teams infrastructure.
Barracuda researchers describe a phishing campaign that starts with DocuSign-themed emails carrying calendar invites pointing to genuine Microsoft OAuth endpoints, then routes victims through Microsoft Teams to a resource hosted on cdn.bloom[.]io. The login page is assembled entirely inside the victim's browser from a blob URL, registers a service worker, and runs inside a sandboxed iframe that receives live instructions from the attacker's backend. Hidden command-and-control configuration indicates the page is part of a centrally managed phishing platform that can be updated and steered across many victims. Barracuda recommends phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 keys or passkeys, monitoring of OAuth flows and redirect chains, and behavior-based identity controls rather than URL blocklisting.
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Inside Knight Office, a New M365 AiTM Phishing Kit
Huntress details Knight Office, a new AiTM phishing kit stealing Microsoft 365 session tokens and registering attacker-controlled devices.
Huntress investigated an August 18, 2026 adversary-in-the-middle attack using the Knight Office phishing kit, which captured Microsoft 365 session tokens via a DocuSign-style lure routed through a Monday.com tracking link and a compromised Joomla site. After token capture, the actor enrolled an unauthorized host in Microsoft Entra ID and bound a Windows Hello for Business key credential to the account. The kit's operator console, found at IP 104.37.188.94, is built on Python Flask and hosts at least 25 .vu phishing domains. Telemetry links the kit to at least nine token-replay logins in two weeks and roughly 700 reported lure emails since April.
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