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Google TAG argues that Italian surveillance firm RCS Labs was helped by ISPs to infect mobile users
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Automatically Detecting DNS Hijacking in Passive DNS
Unit 42's machine learning pipeline detected 6,729 DNS hijacking events between March and September 2024, hitting political parties, ISPs, and universities.
Unit 42 processes roughly 167 million new DNS records daily and applies a machine learning model using 74 features over 169 TB of passive DNS and geolocation data to flag hijacked domains. From March to September 2024 the pipeline screened over 29 billion records and classified 6,729 as DNS hijacking, averaging 38 detections per day; a new model detects hijacks in customer traffic within about 10 minutes. Notable cases include a Hungarian political party's hijacked domain, defacement of a large utility company and ISP, and university and research center domains repurposed for illicit gambling. DNS hijacking typically relies on stolen registrar or DNS provider credentials or cache poisoning, enabling MitM attacks, phishing, drive-by downloads, and scams.
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Hackers Exploit FortiGate SSL-VPN Flaw to Breach Thai ISP and Deploy MeshCentral Backdoor
Threat actors exploited FortiOS SSL-VPN flaw CVE-2024-21762 to breach Thai ISP Triple T Broadband, gaining root-level persistence via MeshCentral agents.
Attackers exploited CVE-2024-21762, an out-of-bounds write enabling unauthenticated RCE in FortiOS SSL-VPN, against Triple T Broadband's FortiGate 60F at mail.3bb.co.th, launching a Node.js reverse shell via a ROP payload. Hunt.io uncovered the operation through an exposed staging directory at 92.63.180[.]133:8888 containing 298 files of exploits, credential-harvesting scripts, session cookies, and a device inventory. Post-compromise, the actors deployed MeshCentral agents (device group TH-3BB, C2 www.ayuthayatech.com) running as root, plus a hidden SUID backdoor at /usr/local/bin/.rc, and also targeted an internal Pentaho/Tomcat server with Ghostcat (CVE-2020-1938). A cleanup script removed logs, shell histories, and web shells while deliberately preserving the MeshCentral agent and SUID backdoor.
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3BB Attacker Used MeshCentral Backdoor for Root Access, Targeted Subscriber Credentials
Hunt.io found an attacker holding root access inside Thai ISP 3BB via a MeshCentral backdoor, targeting subscriber RADIUS credential databases.
Hunt.io discovered an exposed attacker server on June 3, 2026 revealing an ongoing intrusion at 3BB, one of Thailand's largest broadband providers. The attacker maintained hidden MeshCentral agents reporting to www.ayuthayatech[.]com (device group TH-3BB) and held root on internal servers. Recovered scripts sprayed passwords over SSH against more than 55 internal machines, planted web shells, added SSH keys, searched for stored credentials, and targeted RADIUS subscriber credential databases, though exfiltration was not confirmed. The toolkit included a full exploit for FortiGate SSL-VPN flaw CVE-2024-21762 against mail.3bb.co[.]th, but the initial access vector is unestablished, and a cleanup script erased logs while preserving the backdoor.
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The Nansh0u Campaign – Hackers Arsenal Grows Stronger
Guardicore researchers detail the Nansh0u campaign's growing arsenal, with three attacks traced to South African IPs hosted by VolumeDrive.
Guardicore security researchers analyzed three attacks detected in early April through the Guardicore Global Sensor Network (GGSN). All three attacks originated from source IP addresses in South Africa hosted by the VolumeDrive ISP. The write-up catalogs the expanding arsenal and tooling used by the Nansh0u campaign attackers and includes indicators of compromise.
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