Search: “attack simulation”

9 stories in the last 7d

MAL Simulator grounds attack-defense graph simulations in a CRATE-emulated network, training RL attacker and defender agents where attackers outperform search methods.

The MAL Simulator is a cyber operations simulator built on the Meta Attack Language (MAL), enabling decision-driven attack and defense simulations adaptable to new domains without modifying source code. Case studies trained defensive and offensive agents, grounded in data collected from an emulated network implemented in the CRATE cyber range. The trained attacker policy reached designated targets more efficiently than compared search methods, and the trained defender induced lower costs than a naive heuristic under noisy alerts, though defender performance dropped significantly against an RL attacker.

arXiv cs.CRSep 15, 02:59 UTC · 2d agoResearch

Phishing Research Challenges Conventional Security Awareness Testing

Pistachio's 2.47 million phishing simulations across 1,200 organizations show click rates alone mislead, with 30% of IT staff clicking and leak rates more predictive.

Between June 2025 and May 2026, Pistachio sent 2.47 million simulated phishing attempts to more than 123,000 employees at over 1,200 organizations, analyzing click, credential-leak and reporting behavior. Click rates ranged from 26% in Design to 41% in Construction; 30% of tech development and IT staff clicked at least once, while financial services were the most resilient sector. The report argues that click rate alone creates a false sense of security and that combined click, leak and report trends are better resilience indicators.

SecurityWeekSep 11, 17:23 UTC · 5d agoResearch

What Zero-Day Response Should Be in the Post-Mythos Era

Picus Security outlines a zero-day response playbook where defenders simulate exploit technique chains before public PoCs exist.

The article uses PaperCut NG/MF's August incident — exploitation in the wild before any patch, with the first emergency fix bypassed the same day and a third landing September 1 — as the template for AI-accelerated vulnerability response. It walks through a hypothetical CVE-2026-1001 (explicitly made up) to argue defenders should map CVEs to ATT&CK technique chains and simulate them against NGFW, WAF, EDR, endpoint hardening, and SIEM controls within minutes of disclosure. It notes disclosure-to-exploitation time has fallen from 21.5 days to hours.

BleepingComputerSep 15, 13:45 UTC · 1d agoResearch in the wildCVE-2026-1001

A Cyber Range Evaluation of Autonomous Network Incident Response Agents

Cyber range evaluation shows reinforcement learning incident response agents defend emulated networks more efficiently than heuristic policies, depending heavily on adversary behavior.

The paper evaluates agents for automated network intrusion response in a cyber range designed for human operator training, featuring variable topology, red-team emulation, and simulated users. Alerts are generated by a SIEM platform and mapped to a data modeling language used by the agents, with reinforcement learning policies optimized to minimize combined defense and availability costs using a cyber attack simulator. Reinforcement learning agents defended the system more efficiently than heuristic policies, with performance highly dependent on the adversary policy and simulated user behavior.

arXiv cs.CRSep 15, 02:36 UTC · 2d agoResearch

Evaluating Practical Enumeration and Blocking Attacks on the Snowflake Circumvention System

Ethical measurements enumerated 21,000+ Snowflake proxy IPs across ~1,000 ASes; blocking top 1% of ASes disrupts 30% of Snowflakes.

Researchers tested Snowflake's assumptions that proxy IPs cannot be easily enumerated and that blocking them causes unacceptable collateral damage. Over 48 days of real-world measurements (May-June 2025), malicious-client-style enumeration collected over 21,000 unique proxy IPs across almost 1,000 autonomous systems. Blocking the top 1% of ASes blocks more than 30% of observed Snowflakes while affecting about 2.5% of Tranco Top 1M domains, and the broker's load-aware matching leaks stable high-capacity proxies to attackers. Some proposed mitigations have already been integrated into Snowflake.

arXiv cs.CRSep 10, 22:01 UTC · 6d agoResearch1

EFI Pairs Without One-Way Puzzles: Oracle Separations from Communication Complexity

Theorists build a classical oracle where one-way puzzles fail yet EFI pairs survive, separating two candidate minimal assumptions of quantum cryptography.

The paper constructs a single classical oracle relative to which one-way puzzles do not exist, even with an unbounded verifier, while an EFI pair survives every classical-query distinguisher holding advice, making one superposition query at the end. Security is proven by reducing adversary knowledge to communication complexity for Vector-in-Subspace, with the superposition query bounded using random matrix theory. Relative to the oracle, quantum polynomial time offers no advantage on tasks with classical inputs and outputs and there is no proof of quantumness, separating the leading minimal assumptions of quantum cryptography.

arXiv cs.CRSep 10, 17:54 UTC · 6d agoResearch

RobResilience: Implementing and Evaluating a Resilience Framework for Cyber-Physical Embodied Systems

RobResilience implements a runtime resilience framework for robots in Webots/ROS2, evaluating tolerable disruption, degradation, and mitigation feasibility across eight attack scenarios.

The paper implements a formal resilience framework for embodied cyber-physical systems using a PR2 robot and ROS2 in a Webots simulation. At runtime it evaluates three predicates — tolerable disruption (δ), tolerable degradation (γ), and mitigation feasibility (μ) — over a compromised device set derived from IDS confidence scores, triggering mitigation strategies when resilience is lost. Eight attack scenarios systematically covering the full predicate state space confirm runtime behavior matches theoretical definitions. The work addresses 'graceful failure paralysis,' where autonomous systems cannot distinguish safe degraded states from catastrophic hazards during attacks.

arXiv cs.CRSep 15, 15:49 UTC · 1d agoResearch

A GAN-Based Framework for Robust DDoS Attack Detection

WGAN-GP-generated adversarial DDoS traffic augments training data, improving detection resilience against evasion attempts.

Researchers built a DDoS detection framework combining Random Forests, deep neural ensembles, and Transformer-based models trained on CICDDoS2019 with synthetic adversarial flows generated by a Wasserstein GAN with gradient penalty. Hybrid datasets of benign, malicious, and generated traffic taught models more generalizable decision boundaries. Experiments showed improved accuracy and resilience against unseen adversarial traffic, validated on real-world generated flows.

arXiv cs.CRSep 16, 08:04 UTC · 20h agoResearch

Most Firms Unable to Recover Quickly from Ransomware

Fenix24's first State of Recoverability report finds only 0.5% of 800+ ransomware clients neared 24-48 hour recovery targets, with identity failures central.

Drawing on 500+ ransomware recoveries, Fenix24 found only four of 800+ clients (0.5%) came close to their own 24-48 hour recovery targets, and none reached full operations for weeks. 99.2% lacked a documented identity recovery plan, Active Directory typically fell first, and 94% tied backup systems to the compromised directory. In 38% of engagements backups survived but could not carry recovery; storage ran short in 82% of cases and 95% lacked meaningful MFA on critical infrastructure consoles.

Infosecurity MagazineSep 15, 14:30 UTC · 1d agoResearch