Search: “verification”

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Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs

Researchers demonstrate exfiltration through nominally input-only analog pins in mixed-signal ICs, recovering data at 10 kbps on a 55nm PPG front-end.

The paper identifies a directionality-based attack class in analog/mixed-signal (AMS) ICs where data-dependent circuit-offset modulation converts a nominally input-only pin into an outbound information channel. Three host conditions enable the attack: a closed-loop amplifier, an exposed amplifier input, and sufficiently high impedance at that pin. Silicon validation on a photoplethysmography analog front-end in 55nm CMOS showed exfiltration at up to 10 kbps with error-free PRBS recovery, under 0.001% area overhead, and only 0.03 dB SNR reduction.

arXiv cs.CRSep 16, 17:39 UTC · 18h agoResearch

Echo: Learning-based Matching Decompilation using Trusted Back Translation

Researchers introduce Echo, a matching decompiler using trusted back-translation that roughly doubles exact-match rates and outperforms GPT-5.6 and Codex on Mirai.

Echo performs matching decompilation by using compilation as trusted feedback for iterative search: a domain-specific model generates candidate code and compilation configurations, which are recompiled, compared at assembly level, and repaired via rule-based rewriting, neural refinement, and reasoning-based refinement. On function-level benchmarks, Echo produces 2.43x more exact matches than the strongest baseline and the highest structural similarity to ground truth. On the Mirai malware binary, it matches 2.75x and 7.4x as many functions as GPT-5.6 and Codex, respectively.

arXiv cs.CRSep 16, 14:14 UTC · 21h agoResearch1

Forgery of C2PA on a Pixel 10

Researcher forged a Google Pixel 10 C2PA content credential with genuine signatures, showing root-level attackers can fake photo provenance.

A Hacker Factor blog post demonstrates an AI-generated 'unicorn glitter milk' news photo carrying a valid, cryptographically signed C2PA manifest traceable to Google's Pixel camera certificate chain, passing validation in Adobe Inspect and the CAI Verify tool with a verified timestamp. The author, working with UMBC's PASAWG working group, reported to Google and C2PA in November 2025 that root access on a Pixel device could sign arbitrary images as camera captures; after 90 days without resolution, details were published. The finding undermines C2PA Assurance Level 2 claims made for Pixel 10 Content Credentials.

Lobsters · securitySep 16, 13:24 UTC · 22h agoResearch