ZeroHour

Search: “recursive”

6 stories

Guppy: Efficient Light Clients via Recursive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Guppy lets blockchain light clients verify full state via recursive zero-knowledge proofs without validators maintaining state commitments, processing thousands of updates per second.

Guppy is a light-client protocol in which validators commit only to state updates while an off-chain, untrusted service secured by recursive zero-knowledge proofs maintains a verifiable Merkle tree over the full state. A hash-chain commitment moves validator signature verification out of the proving circuit, and a parallel recursive proving pipeline keeps latency growth logarithmic with throughput. A Plonky2-based implementation maintains a tree of size 2^30 while processing thousands of updates per second, adding only 2-4 seconds of latency without increasing block-construction complexity.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoResearch

Mapping out your unknown: A threat hunter’s guide to GitHubnew

Datadog Security Labs publishes a threat-hunting guide with audit-log queries to detect GitHub token theft, device code phishing, and source code exfiltration.

Datadog's threat-hunting guide covers GitHub audit log queries for detecting compromised accounts, stolen personal access tokens, and malicious OAuth app authorizations. Attackers typically obtain credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, leaked secrets, or device code phishing, then map private repositories, exfiltrate source code, and pivot into connected cloud and CI/CD environments. The guide maps detections to MITRE techniques like T1078 and T1528 and documents GitHub logging quirks affecting attribution, token metadata, and visibility fields.

Datadog Security Labs · 13h agoResearch in the wild

Hacking Public Wi-Fi DNS to Steal Credentials

Attackers can hijack public Wi-Fi DNS to redirect users to credential-stealing fake login pages; commenters debate HTTPS limits and mitigations like encrypted DNS.

The discussion examines how an attacker controlling DNS on shared or public Wi-Fi networks can redirect requests for legitimate services to attacker-controlled servers to steal credentials. Commenters analyze whether HTTPS and certificates mitigate the attack, noting attackers often rely on HTTP or browser trust quirks. Suggested defenses include encrypted DNS (DoH), DNSSEC, and travel routers running OpenWRT. No specific campaign, victims, or indicators are provided.

Schneier on Security · Aug 17, 2026Research1